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1 S Sicherheit und Frieden FSecurity and Peace Herausgeber: Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska Dr. Walter E. Feichtinger Dr. Volker Franke Prof. Dr. Hans J. Giessmann Prof. Dr. Heiner Hänggi Heinz-Dieter Jopp Dr. Patricia Schneider Gastherausgeber: Florian P. Kühn Berit Bliesemann de Guevara Themenschwerpunkt: Internationale Gemeinschaft Rhetorik und Realität International Community Rhetoric and Reality The International Community Rhetoric or Reality? Tracing a seemingly well-known apparition Berit Bliesemann de Guevara und Florian P. Kühn Reconstructing Afghanistan: Is the West eclipsing the International Community? Eva Gross On the Fringes of the International Community: The Making and Survival of Rogue States Martin Beck und Johannes Gerschewski 2 ISSN Jahrgang X Nomos Responsible Members of the International Community? Multilateral Agreements and Environmental Protection in the Post-Soviet States Amy Forster Rothbart Symptoms of Democracy in Transdniestria Daria Isachenko Weitere Beiträge von... Detlev Justen, Markus Kaim, Diana Digol

2 I m p r e s s u m I n h a lt Schriftleitung: Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska Redaktion: Dr. Patricia Schneider (V.i.S.d.P.) Sybille Reinke de Buitrago Dr. Martin Kahl Susanne Bund Redaktionsanschrift: S+F c/o IFSH, Beim Schlump 83, D Hamburg Tel Fax Website: Druck und Verlag: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbh & Co. KG, Waldseestr. 3-5, D Baden-Baden, Tel , Fax Anzeigenverwaltung und Anzeigenannahme: Sales friendly Bettina Roos, Siegburger Straße 123, Bonn, Tel , Fax , Die Zeitschrift, sowie alle in ihr enthaltenen einzelnen Beiträge und Abbildungen sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung, die nicht ausdrücklich vom Urheberrechtsgesetz zugelassen ist, bedarf der vorherigen Zustimmung des Verlags. Namentlich gekennzeichnete Artikel müssen nicht die Meinung der Herausgeber/ Redaktion wiedergeben. Unverlangt eingesandte Manuskripte für die keine Haftung übernommen wird gelten als Veröffentlichungsvorschlag zu den Bedingungen des Verlages. Es werden nur unveröffentlichte Originalarbeiten angenommen. Die Verfasser erklären sich mit einer nicht sinnentstellenden redaktionellen Bearbeitung einverstanden. Erscheinungsweise: vierteljährlich Bezugspreis 2009: jährlich 76,, Einzelheft 21,, Jahresabonnement für Studenten 55, (gegen Nachweis). Alle Preise verstehen sich inkl. MwSt. zzgl. Versandkosten; Bestellungen nehmen entgegen: Der Buchhandel und der Verlag; Kündigung: Drei Monate vor Kalenderjahresende. Zahlungen jeweils im Voraus an: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Postbank Karlsruhe, Konto (BLZ ) und Stadtsparkasse Baden-Baden, Konto (BLZ ). I issn X Dieser Ausgabe liegt ein Prospekt der Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft bei. Wir bitten freundlichst um Beachtung. Editorial III Themenschwerpunkt Internationale Gemeinschaft Rhetorik und Realität International Community Rhetoric and Reality The International Community Rhetoric or Reality? Tracing a seemingly well-known apparition Berit Bliesemann de Guevara und Florian P. Kühn Reconstructing Afghanistan: Is the West eclipsing the International Community? Eva Gross On the Fringes of the International Community: The Making and Survival of Rogue States Martin Beck und Johannes Gerschewski Responsible Members of the International Community? Multilateral Agreements and Environmental Protection in the Post- Soviet States Amy Forster Rothbart Symptoms of Democracy in Transdniestria Daria Isachenko BEITRÄGE AUS SICHERHEITSPOLITIK UND F R I E D E N S F O R S C H U N G Der Vertrag von Oslo über das umfassende Verbot von Streumunition: Die Convention on Cluster Munitions Detlev Justen Zehn Jahre auf der NATO-Agenda - Terrorismusbekämpfung durch die nordatlantische Allianz Markus Kaim Right or wrong: Debate in Russia on Conflict in Georgia Diana Digol NEUERSCHEINUNGEN ANNOTATIONEN BESPRECHUNGEN Dieses Heft wurde aus Mitteln der Deutschen Stiftung Friedensforschung gefördert. S + F Security and Peace Sicherheit und Frieden 27. Jahrgang, S /2009 S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

3 S+F lädt Autorinnen und Autoren zur Einsendung von Beiträgen zur Veröffentlichung ein S+F ist die führende deutsche Fachzeitschrift für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik. S+F will Forum der Kommunikation für Wissenschaft und Politik, zwischen ziviler Gesellschaft und Streitkräften sein, in dem Analyse, Insiderbericht, Standortbestimmung und Einschätzung Platz haben. Entscheidend für die Veröffentlichung ist der Beitrag eines Textes zu nationalen und internationalen Diskussionen in der Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensforschung, von naturwissenschaftlichen Aspekten der Rüstungskontrolle bis zu Fragen der Nationenbildung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Jedes Heft von S+F ist einem Schwerpunktthema gewidmet. Neben Beiträgen zum Schwerpunkt werden aber auch Texte zu allgemeinen Themen der Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensforschung veröffentlicht. Autorinnen und Autoren haben die Wahl zwischen Beurteilung der Texte durch Herausgeber und Redaktion oder einem zusätzlichen Begutachtungsverfahren mit externen Gutachtern (peer-reviewed, anonymisiert). Dieses Verfahren nimmt mehr Zeit in Anspruch (zur Erstellung der Gutachten, für die Überarbeitung etc.). S+F strebt an, den Anteil der extern referierten Aufsätze zu erhöhen, wird aber auch weiterhin Texte veröffentlichen, deren Qualität von der Redaktion und dem für ein Heft verantwortlichen Herausgeber beurteilt wurde. Die nachfolgend angegebenen Deadlines gelten für die Einreichung von Beiträgen im Rahmen der jeweiligen Schwerpunktthemen. Aufsätze zu Themen außerhalb der Schwerpunkte können jederzeit eingereicht werden. Call for papers/ Herausgeber und Redaktion rufen zur Einsendung von Beiträgen auf Folgende Schwerpunktthemen sind für die nächsten Hefte von S+F vorgesehen: 4/2009: Ressourcensicherheit, Deadline 01. Juni /2010: Gender und Sicherheit, Deadline 31. August /2010: Innere und äußere Sicherheit, Deadline 15. November 2009 Texte können in englischer und deutscher Sprache verfasst sein und sollten bis Zeichen (inkl. Leerzeichen) lang sein. Weitere Hinweise für Autorinnen und Autoren finden sich auf der Webseite der Zeitschrift unter Autorenhinweise. Bitte richten Sie Ihre Fragen an: Website: Die Artikel der Zeitschrift S+F werden in mehreren nationalen und internationalen bibliographischen Datenbanken nachgewiesen. Dazu gehören gehören u.a. Online Contents OLC-SSG Politikwissenschaft und Friedensforschung, PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) International Database, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts und World Affairs Online (hrsg. vom Fachinformationsverbund Internationale Beziehungen und Länderkunde FIV) (siehe auch S+F invites authors to submit suitable papers for publication S+F is the leading German journal for peace research and security policy. S+F aims to serve as a forum of analysis, insider reports and opinion pieces for research and politics linking civil society and the armed forces. Decisions on publication are made on the basis of the contribution of a text to national and international discussions on peace and security issues, considering scientific aspects of arms control to questions of nation-building in post-war societies. Every issue of S+F is focused on a particular theme. In addition, texts addressing general aspects of security policy and peace research are also published. Authors can choose to have the text evaluated by the publisher and editorial team or by an external evaluation process (double-blind peer-review), the latter is more time intensive (for the evaluation process, revision, etc.). S+F intends to increase the number of externally evaluated contributions but will continue to publish texts which have been assessed by the editorial team and the publisher responsible for the issue. The deadlines listed below are for contributions for a specific theme. Contributions on other topics can be made at any time. Call for Papers/ Publisher and editorial team call for contributions The next issues of S+F will have the following themes: 4/2009: Resource Security, Deadline 1 June /2010: Gender and Security, Deadline 31 August /2010: Internal and External Security, Deadline 15 November 2009 Texts may be written in English or German and should be between 25,000-30,000 characters long (incl. spaces). Further information for authors can be found on the magazine website under Notes to Authors. Please direct your queries to: Website: Articles of the journal S+F are entered in various national and international bibliographic databases. Among them are Online Contents OLC-SSG Politikwissenschaft und Friedensforschung (Political Science and Peace Research), PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) International Database, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts and World Affairs Online (by the Fachinformationsverbund Internationale Beziehungen und Länderkunde FIV / The German Information Network International Relations and Area Studies) (see also portal.de). II S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

4 E D I T O R I A L Internationale Gemeinschaft Rhetorik und Realität Oft wird politischer Handlungsbedarf unter Berufung auf die Internationale Gemeinschaft begründet. Dabei ist meist unklar, was gemeint ist: Sind es die Staaten selbst oder ihre Organisationen, wie etwa die Vereinten Nationen? Sind es zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure, die in transnationaler Solidarität aufgefordert sind zu helfen? Sind es die reichen Demokratien des Westens, welche die Verantwortung für die Welt schultern? Der Begriff findet im politischen Sprachgebrauch in jedem oben genannten Sinn Verwendung, was eine klare Analyse des Gemeinten erschwert. Es lassen sich zwei wesentliche Sichtweisen unterscheiden, wer oder was die Internationale Gemeinschaft ist: Einerseits bezieht sich der Begriff normativ-solidarisch auf von allen geteilte, universelle Werte, die ihr Fundament im internationalen Recht haben und wesentlich von internationalen Organisationen getragen werden. Andererseits beschreibt er, dass Einzelne oder Akteursgruppen im Namen der Internationalen Gemeinschaft handeln, dabei aber nicht selten eigene Interessen verfolgen. Beide Sichtweisen vernachlässigen jedoch das Wechselspiel, in dem unterschiedliche Akteure mit rhetorischen Mitteln auf die Gestaltung von Politik einwirken. Diese Dynamik gilt es zu erfassen. Die Internationale Gemeinschaft stellt einen Referenzrahmen dar, innerhalb dessen konkrete Situationen politisch beurteilt werden können und der so normative Orientierung ermöglicht. Gleichzeitig dient er der Konstruktion von Gruppen, die sich in ihrem Namen politisch engagieren. Als praktische und rhetorische Referenz kann die Internationale Gemeinschaft darüber hinaus von einer Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Akteure herangezogen werden, um internationale und lokale Politik zu legitimieren. Auf sie Bezug zu nehmen, sagt jedoch noch nichts über die jeweilige Werteorientierung der Akteure aus. Obendrein unterliegt die Internationale Gemeinschaft selbst einem steten Wertewandel. Die Essenz des Begriffs liegt also in seinem politisch ambivalenten Gebrauch. Rhetorik und Realität der Internationalen Gemeinschaft lassen sich nur konkret bestimmen und aus spezifischen Beispielen ableiten. Trotz der Allgegenwart der Internationalen Gemeinschaft in Medien und Wissenschaft steht eine systematische Beschäftigung mit dem Phänomen bislang aus. Der Themenschwerpunkt dieser Ausgabe von S+F kann hier lediglich einen Anfang machen. In diesem Sinne beleuchten wir das Wechselspiel zwischen Image und Praxis der Internationalen Gemeinschaft. Im einleitenden Artikel stellen wir konzeptionelle Überlegungen an, die den Referenzrahmen für die Beiträge des Schwerpunkts bilden. Eva Gross beschreibt die zunehmende Fragmentierung der Internationalen Gemeinschaft beim (Wieder-)Aufbau Afghanistans. Während zunächst die Vereinten Nationen die Aufgabe der politischen Koordination wahrnehmen sollten, geriet das Engagement mehr und mehr zu einer Angelegenheit des Westens. Dessen starre Vorstellungen von Staatlichkeit verhindern, dass lokale Realitäten und regionale Akteure stärker in die Politikgestaltung einbezogen werden. Die Stigmatisierung von Staaten als Schurkenstaat und ihre Auswirkungen behandeln Martin Beck und Johannes Gerschewski. Sie argumentieren, dass dies einen Ausschluss aus der Internationalen Gemeinschaft bedeutet, der seinerseits Handlungseinschränkungen für deren Mitglieder mit sich bringt. Die betroffenen Regime finden sich in der paradoxen Situation moralischer Exklusion bei fortdauernder rechtlicher und struktureller Inklusion wieder. Sie können die intendierte Transformation vermeiden, indem sie die divergierenden Interessen innerhalb der Staatengemeinschaft zu ihren Gunsten nutzen. Amy Forster Rothbart zeigt, dass die post-sowjetischen Staaten Kasachstan und Ukraine internationalen Umweltabkommen hauptsächlich beigetreten sind, um in der Internationalen Gemeinschaft anerkannt und gleich behandelt zu werden. Zweck des Beitritts war der Nachweis von Demokratie, Rechtstaatlichkeit und guter Weltbürgerschaft. Unterdessen erfordert die Umsetzung der Abkommen auch interne Reformen, die jedoch abhängig vom Willen der lokalen Eliten unterschiedlich weit reichen. Daria Isachenko untersucht am Beispiel der moldawischen Region Transnistrien, wie Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen legitimiert werden, indem auf die Internationale Gemeinschaft verwiesen wird. Der Beitrag fokussiert auf virtuelle Techniken, mit denen Demokratie simuliert wird, um die Forderung nach Eigenstaatlichkeit zu untermauern. Als normativer Rahmen wirkt die Internationale Gemeinschaft so auf die politische Praxis ein. Außerhalb des Schwerpunkts in diesem Heft analysiert Detlev Justen die Stärken und Schwächen der Konvention über Streumunition von Ende Markus Kaim untersucht die Bemühungen der NATO bei der Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus. Diana Digol stellt die russischen Positionen zum militärischen Konflikt mit Georgien in 2008 dar. Die Beiträge dieses Sonderhefts, das wir als Gastherausgeber betreuen durften, basieren zum Teil auf Konferenzpapieren, die auf einem Panel der Jahrestagung der International Studies Association (ISA) im März 2008 in San Francisco, USA, vorgetragen und diskutiert wurden. Alle Aufsätze wurden anschließend einem zweifachen anonymen Gutachterverfahren unterzogen. Wir danken allen Gutachtern für ihre ausführlichen und hilfreichen Kommentare sowie Delf Rothe für unverzichtbare Dienste bei der redaktionellen Bearbeitung. Unser besonderer Dank gilt den Herausgebern von S+F, die uns die Möglichkeit eingeräumt haben, dieses Themenheft der Zeitschrift zusammenzustellen. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara & Florian P. Kühn S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009 III

5 E D I T O R I A L International Community Rhetoric and Reality Urgent political action is often legitimized with reference to the international community. What is meant by this term remains unclear: Is it the states themselves or their organizations, like the United Nations? Is it civil society actors who are requested to help in transnational solidarity? Is it the rich Western democracies, which shoulder the responsibility for the world? In political parlance the term is utilized in all of the above senses, hence complicating its meaning. Two main perspectives on the international community can be distinguished: On the one hand, the term in a normativesolidary way refers to shared universal values founded in international law and mainly borne by international organizations. On the other hand, it describes individual or collective agents who act in the name of the international community, while often pursuing self-interests. However, both perspectives disregard the interplay of different actors who influence and shape politics by rhetorical means. This dynamic needs to be captured. The international community constitutes a frame of reference within which specific situations can be judged politically and normatively. At the same time, it serves the construction of groups who get politically involved in its name. Furthermore, as a practical and rhetorical reference, the international community can be drawn on to legitimize international and local politics. Referring to it, however, does not reveal anything about the respective actor s value orientation. On top of this, the international community itself is subject to a steady change of values. The term s essence thus consists in its politically ambivalent use. Rhetoric and reality of the international community can only be identified and derived from specific examples. Despite the international community s omnipresence in media and science, a systematic appraisal of the phenomenon is still lacking. The thematic focus of this issue of Security and Peace can only serve as a starting point. In this regard, we elaborate on the interplay between image and practice of the international community. In the introductory article, we consider conceptual aspects, which serve as a guiding framework for this special issue s contributions. Eva Gross, then, describes the international community s increasing fragmentation in the case of the (re-)construction of Afghanistan. While at first the UN was supposed to assume the task of political coordination, the intervention more and more turned into a matter of the West. The latter s inflexible ideas of statehood hinder a stronger inclusion of local realities and regional actors in the shaping of policies. How states are stigmatized as rogue states and the implications of this are scrutinized by Martin Beck and Johannes Gerschewski. They argue that such labeling excludes these states from the international community, and also limits the community s members scope of action. The affected regimes find themselves in the paradoxical situation of being morally excluded while the legal and structural inclusion endures. They can avoid the intended transformation by using the divergent interests within the community of states to their own benefit. Amy Forster Rothbart shows that the post-soviet states Kazakhstan and Ukraine have mainly signed onto international environmental agreements in order to be recognized and treated as equal partners by the international community. The purpose of accession was to demonstrate democracy, rule of law and good global citizenship. Meanwhile, agreement implementation also called for internal reforms. Their results are divergent depending on the will of local elites. Taking the Moldovan region of Transdniestria as an example, Daria Isachenko scrutinizes how quests for independence are legitimized by pointing to the international community. The contribution focuses on virtual techniques which help to simulate democracy in order to underscore the claim to sovereignty. As a normative frame the international community takes thus effect on political practice. Outside the focus of this issue, Detlev Justen examines and assesses the Convention on Cluster Munitions of late 2008 and its key regulations. Markus Kaim evaluates NATO s efforts in countering international terrorism. Diana Digol gives in her article an overview of Russian positions on its 2008 military conflict with Georgia. The articles in this guest-edited special issue are partly based on conference papers which were presented and discussed at the International Studies Association s (ISA) annual convention in San Francisco, USA, in March Afterwards, all contributions have undergone two double-blind reviews. Our special thanks go to the editors of Security and Peace who have given us the opportunity to compile this special issue. We would also like to thank the referees for their detailed and helpful reviews as well as Delf Rothe for indispensable editorial assistance. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara & Florian P. Kühn IV S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

6 S+F Sicherheit und Frieden Security and Peace Jahrgang S Herausgeber Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH) Dr. Walter E. Feichtinger, Landesverteidigungsakademie, Institut für Friedenssicherung und Konfliktmanagement, Wien Dr. Volker Franke, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) Prof. Dr. Hans J.Giessmann, Berghof Forschungszentrum für konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung, Berlin Prof. Dr. Heiner Hänggi, Genfer Zentrum für die demokratische Kontrolle der Streitkräfte (DCAF), Genf Kapitän zur See Heinz-Dieter Jopp, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg Dr. Patricia Schneider, IFSH Schriftleitung Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska Redaktion Dr. Patricia Schneider (V.i.S.d.P.), IFSH Sybille Reinke de Buitrago Dr. Martin Kahl Susanne Bund Beirat Dr. Alyson J.K. Bailes, University of Iceland, Reykjavik Dr. Detlef Bald, München Prof. Dr. Joachim Betz, GIGA, Institut für Asienstudien, Hamburg Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Dürr, Träger des Alternativen Nobelpreises, München Prof. Dr. Pál Dunay, Genfer Zentrum für Sicherheitspolitik (GCSP) Dr. Sabine Jaberg, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg Prof. Dr. Charles A. Kupchan, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Dr. Martin Kutz, Hamburg Dr. Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, Willy-Brandt-Zentrum für Deutschland- und Europastudien, Wroclaw Prof. Dr. Susanne Feske, Universität Münster Dr. Martina Fischer, Berghof Forschungszentrum für Konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung, Berlin Prof. Dr. Sabine von Schorlemer, TU Dresden Bates Gill, PhD, SIPRI, Stockholm Prof. Ljubica Jelusic, Universität Ljubljana, Slowenien T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T The International Community Rhetoric or Reality? Tracing a seemingly well-known apparition Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian P. Kühn* Abstract: The term International Community is commonly understood to refer either to the norms of international policy or to a coalition of concerned actors. However, in this article, we argue that it is the interplay of the term s image and the practice of its invocation that shapes its character. It can be used by many different groups, state and non-state non state alike, to locate their political goals in the context of a wider array of values. Usually these norms are state-related and can be used to simulate political relevance. Conversely, actors defying widely accepted values can be excluded and policies against them legitimized. Addressing domestic as well as international audiences, the claim to be acting as or on behalf of the International Community is mostly rhetorical but has very real political consequences. Keywords: Internationale Gemeinschaft, Staatlichkeit, nichtstaatliche internationale Akteure, Legitimation, politische Normen, International community, statehood, non-state international actors, legitimization, political norms 1. Introduction Of the (scarce) literature on the international community, a 2002 issue of Foreign Policy offers a broad impression of the concept s complexity. Nine thinkers, policymakers, journalists and activists were asked about what the term constituted for them. Some authors identified Dr. Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian P. Kühn, M.A./M.P.S., are researchers at the Institute for International Relations, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg. We would like to thank Klaus Schlichte and Andrea Charron for their helpful comments and support. the international community as essentially, the United States and Europe (Gowers 2002: 33), or as the United States joined by some allies and clients (Chomsky 2002: 34). Others excoriated it as the false community composed of an inchoate global majority and organized ruling elites (Bello 2002: 41), or dismissed the term as being for the naïve, since [i]ts diffusion of responsibility excuses countries that have no intention of lending a hand (Wedgwood 2002: 44). Yet others viewed the international community as a body of globalized moral ideas that can shape institutions and inform policy choices (Hehir 2002: 38) and are enshrined in (international) law, institutions, and civil society, which together with states bear responsibil S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

7 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn, The International Community ity for upholding these values (Annan 2002). For some, the United Nations the most universal international organization with 190 member states is the closest embodiment of the international community (Ogata 2002: 39), while for others, transnational civil society is the most promising locus of a new community in the making [that] comprises many communities tied by common interests and values, but its social expression is inflected by different histories and cultures (Bello 2002: 41). As such, the international community not only comprises state actors and international organizations, but a wide range of transnational societal actors including international NGOs, social movements, and religious authorities. These views share the institutionalist idea that states and their societies are increasingly interdependent and that today s problems need concerted action. In his Doctrine of the International Community Tony Blair (1999) outlined that today more than ever before, we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour. The perceptions and usages of the term international community fit two broad categories: Normatively, the international community represents some form of moral collectivity of humankind which exists as an ethical referent if not organized in any way (Buzan/Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005: 32). As a moral marker, it bears the idea of universal values that are (or should be) shared by a majority of actors, and of an imperative of solidarity among states or even among all human beings (Kovach 2003; May 2007). International institutions, especially international law, organizations above all the UN and regimes in various policy fields, such as environmental protection, disarmament, or human rights, are seen as precursors and foundations of a collective encompassing all states and, ultimately, their citizens. Yet, power relations, domination and dependency are analytically largely missing. Descriptively, the international community is a particularistic term usually referring to the West, or more broadly to a set of liberal democratic states, although with overtones that this group somehow speaks (and sometimes acts) for humankind as a whole (Buzan/Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005: 32). This notion captures power asymmetries and points to corresponding functions of the idea of international community neglecting universalistic goals. Yet, highlighting realist concepts such as power and interests disregards ideational factors that influence the international community s discursive and practical construction. This includes internal and external expectations, public opinion and control, the (self-)binding effects of international agreements, as well as social mechanisms of guilt, shame and honour (e.g. Lebow 2006; Schlichte/Veit 2007: 11-17). Escaping these categories seeming antagonism, we claim that analytically, both approaches fall short of fully capturing the essence of the international community. A concept of international community needs to account for different aspects of the phenomenon and offer analytical tools able to capture their implications for rhetoric and reality, instead of adding more layers to the discussion. Accordingly, we elaborate on the idea of the international community and its inherent aspects, and conclude with an overview of the contributions to this guestedited issue, all of which have been subject to two double-blind reviews. 2. Capturing the international community Aware of the term s diverse facets encompassing discourses as well as practices, we construe the international community as both a specific, but not a priori determined actor group, and a rhetorical device. It can be invoked by a range of actors from the local to the international level and for different purposes; its practical relevance derives from interests and ideas. As an actor group, the international community is composed in relation to the policy issue concerned. Actors share values and norms or simply define political problems as concerning. They become involved in designing policy to tackle an issue that is framed as a matter of common interest or international importance. The international community is only called upon in specific situations, which tend to be compared to similar events and to be classified insinuating a certain set of reactions commonly accepted as appropriate. This can include labelling and demarcating actors as deviant. Hence, instead of being an all-encompassing description of international politics constituents, the international community helps to construct in-group/out-group relations and may be an exclusive concept. As a practical and rhetorical device, the international community can be invoked by different actors and for different purposes. Actors include state and non-state agents as well as heterogeneous stakeholders straddling the contested field of ingroup/out-group dichotomies. They can make use of the image of and ideas attached to the international community, as well as of tensions arising between image and practices. A common purpose of invoking the international community is the legitimization of domestic and international politics. 2.1 The dynamic composition and normative foundation of the international community In its most general sense, the international community is a discursively formed group of agents who interact in the international political realm. Its constituent parts can be specified with regard to a specific policy issue or political situation. It is simultaneously unspecific, however, in that the composition, normative foundations and functions of the international community can differ from case to case and may change dynamically over time. Its collective political action in the international realm is at least partly codified in the UN system and international law. Yet, also political actions outside this system like military interventions that are not authorised by the UN Security Council can be discursively framed as politics by and/or in the name of the international community. Especially when large-scale emergencies occur be it natural disasters, gross human rights abuses or genocide the inter 74 S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

8 Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn, The International Community T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T national community is supposed to be responsible for an adequate response. 1 As the implied set of universal norms is not necessarily agreed to by all, the concept is often used to construct them in the first place. In this context, political action is portrayed to be taken on behalf of a general will. This idea bears a notion of Rousseau s volonté générale, which presupposes both the constituents intention to be a community and their common will to solve political problems. The idea of a general will portrays the international community as unitary problem-solving agency, although the actors involved may be voluntary contributors or obliged to act due to security, economic, social or environmental concerns (cf. Ellis 2009). Hence, in reality, it is not as will-based and inclusive as it appears. The application of the concept nevertheless serves as a legitimization device for political action, disguising a lack of actual mechanisms to establish a common will; outside the proceedings of regular UN bodies, the international community acts on an emergency basis, rather than according to pre-prepared scripts of crisis management. These practices show that the term is historic. As a value system, international community cannot claim universal validity. While from the early 17th century the idea of a community of states guided philosophical reasoning about international law, only after 1945 has it found its way into material law (Tomuschat 1995). Following the Cold War, liberalization of world politics intensified, in turn shaping normative perspectives. Unless one subscribes to the view of an End of History (Fukuyama), this value system might itself be transformed over time. Such changes may take place fast, triggered by force (e.g. terrorism) or systemic collapse, for example of the world economical structures. Usually, however, norms mutate gradually by different readings of law, by changes in its application or by emergent challenges calling for regulation (e.g. bird flu). These regulations, in turn, reshape the views of the actors and their role in the international community. As Responsibility to Protect (R2P) shows, the sovereignty of states may be weakened as a binding norm when state functions gain importance for the definition of statehood. R2P legitimizes international interventions in states that fail to adhere to their protective duties towards their population. This transforms the norm of sovereignty, which has been a constitutive element of international relations for the last centuries. However, this transformation does not include all states, but rather reflects power relations. Also, as of yet, it can hardly be described as firmly codified. While the guiding image of international relations as being exclusively comprised of states has always overlooked societal factors, gradually the inviolability of sovereignty loses relevance even in legal terms. 1 Searching Google for quotations using the phrase the international community needs to act, results in over documents of this wording. A brief review of these sources suggests an overwhelming use in the context of peace and security, mainly in the face of humanitarian crises such as refugee movements, starvation, diseases or human rights violations caused by internal wars, government abuses, or natural disasters. 2.2 The international community as a legitimization device While reference to and formation of norms constitute the international community, they also serve to explain, justify and legitimize its political action. Much of these norms correlate with international law. All states have access to the UN General Assembly s Sixth Committee and other UN agencies, 2 which consider legal questions and help to prepare conventions. Also, resolutions of the UN Security Council (SC) especially if they declare a certain behaviour as illegal can have quasi-judicial impact since they define legal terms and hence predetermine further perceptions of (il)legality (Samuels 2007: 61-70). Smaller states little diplomatic capacity limits their chances of establishing norms, while politically more integrated states can instigate support. Therefore, UN regulations often reflect their views. In addition, international/globalized media, as well as trans national societal actors play an important role in shaping political perceptions and triggering action. Until the ages of internet communications and influential non-western media outlets such as Al Jazeera, public discussions were mainly led by Western media corporations, and the norms represented as the international community s could well be regarded as Western-turned-global values. Since access to electronic media has become prevalent in most parts of the world, web logs ( blogs ), independent media, information platforms of advocacy groups and activists as well as influential think tanks, such as the International Crisis Group, increasingly influence political agenda-setting. The actors constituting the international community interact to frame their perceptions of reality to formulate policy (Goffman 1974). As such, the term international community can apply urgency to a matter - which it may lose over time. The security policy importance following the 9/11 attacks is a case in point; the Taliban were condemned for their support of terrorism, and the international community supported their removal from power in Afghanistan by military means. The invocation of the term international community assigns a distinct phenomenon with relevance to all, keeping potential free-riders at bay: if an issue concerns all, individual actors cannot stay out of the political process without sidelining themselves. However, in practice, the actual commitment to political measures often differs widely within the international community and is subject to disputes over what states or organizations ought to contribute as vividly observable in the intricate bargaining processes regarding the international climate regime. Finally, the concept allows keeping issues off the international agenda. While Afghanistan is a matter of the international community, Chechnya was (and is) not; while global warming and its consequences are, the depletion of water and fertile soil are not. While piracy was not until recently, the international community has now sent warships to the Horn of Africa; after having been successfully securitized (Wæver 1995), 2 E.g. the International Court of Justice, the UN Commission on International Trade Law or the International Law Commission. S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

9 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn, The International Community piracy will be on the international community s priority list for a while. Bringing a problem into the public sphere and depicting it in a way that stresses its meaning to state, corporate or cultural interests, and connecting it to the international community s obligation to take action adds to the legitimization, which might be lacking otherwise. In a particular historic moment a group can thus make use of the term to enhance the validity of its own concerns (Kühn 2008). 2.3 The construction of exclusivity and its limits International codified and customary law as a set of norms and values allows identifying and denouncing deviant behaviour. Although international community is an inclusive term, such labelling can demarcate outsiders and underscore the general validity of norms by demarcating aberrations. Also, it strengthens the we -feeling of those within the group. This is in line with the English School s idea of international society, which exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules (Bull 1977: 13). To be conscious of these rules (the statics of international order, 1977: 19) means to acknowledge the virulence of war and struggle for power among states, [...] transnational solidarity and conflict, cutting across the divisions among states, and [...] cooperation and regulated intercourse among states (Bull 1977: 41). At the same time, it permits to locate where behaviour runs counter to basic assumptions about the rules, in turn reinforcing them. However, international community transcends the ideas of international society in important ways. The English School s main focus rests on states (conscious) behaviour in the international system. As the state system originates from historical developments in Europe, most of its basic values such as sovereignty, territoriality, or secularism are those of the European nation-state. To ascribe them global validity means to assume that imposed values represent a strong society (Buzan 1991: 167). Likewise, diverse and dynamic political challenges forbid the presupposition of rules, which states can know to exist and readily apply (Daase/Feske/Peters 2002: 268). Transnational relations are shaped by constructions of reality that can hardly be described as originating exclusively from states. In the international community, state and non-state ideas compete. On the state s level, perceived inequalities become the focal point of value discussions. The question of whether or not states may possess nuclear weapons is a case in point. Even G8 governments need to enhance the legitimacy of their policy against Iran s nuclear ambitions with a plea to the international community to act as a united front on the basis of a mutually agreed position, as they did at the 2007 Heiligendamm summit (G8 2007). On the other hand, societal actors sometimes denounce the European form of statehood per se, for example on religious grounds. The Islamist s notion of an all-encompassing Ummah (Islamic Nation) transcends state borders in this regard (Roy 2004: 97-99). Ideational conflicts put the legitimacy of stigmatizing actors as outsiders to a test. Therefore, the idea of international community, while being aware of the Western origin of most of its norms, must be able to capture competition and sometimes antagonism of values. Legitimacy, hence, seems to be crucially important if individual states are to be successfully labelled as outside the community. Referring to standards within the community, political pressure can be exerted against those who fail to comply beyond a Kantian notion of a foedus pacificum (League of Peace) of liberal democracies acting against outsiders in self-defence only (Giesen 2004). This leads to a paradoxical situation in which actors are morally excluded from the community while legally and structurally still being part of it. Even though being framed as out-group actors, deviators like rogue states remain part of the international system because excluding them from a value-based in-group does not deprive them of basic qualities like statehood or sovereignty (see Beck/Gerschewski in this volume). The politics of inclusive exclusion opens up a variety of possible reactions. For example, opposition groups can present themselves as part of a global norms community in order to advance their political stance, including calls for sanctions; the African National Congress (ANC) claimed [b]etter to suffer the hardships of sanctions [...] than the brutalities of racial repression (Cortright/Lopez 2002: 96). This shows how blurred the internal-external distinction can be: the global interrelation of world society which encompasses all states and societies simultaneously counteracts the constructed exclusion (Jung 2001). The tension arising from the inconsistency between politics of exclusion and underlying inclusive structures creates leeway for navigating in and taking advantage of this complexity. A variety of actors, with mixed sets of ideas and interests, can make use of the concept of the international community, transforming it case by case into quite a practical set of political actions. 2.4 Invoking the international community and its intricate effects Legitimizing and/or pursuing specific policies by invoking the international community is open to actors on both sides of the in-group/out-group distinction. Hence, it is the intricate, not always intended ways in which its image and reality can take effect that have to be at the centre of analysis. Two main audiences of international community -related actions can be distinguished. One is the global public, that is the international community itself. Political actors, often governments, but also societal actors pursuing specific goals, may strive for international resources ideational (e.g. recognition, legitimacy) as well as material (e.g. investments, donor aid). Signing on to regimes and treaties to present oneself as equal is common practice among newly emerging states (see Forster Rothbart in this volume). Subscription to environmental protection, human rights, disarmament and other regimes intents to show a state s dedication to participate in the grown up - field of international affairs. The Bosnian central government, for example, regards the participation in international interventions as a means to demonstrate the country s maturity to move on from being an international protectorate. Although 76 S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

10 Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn, The International Community T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T this contribution is militarily negligible, the political action is highly symbolical (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009). A second audience is the domestic one. In this regard, invoking the international community may serve local state and non-state actors to generate support for internal political power struggles. In June 2008, for example, Zimbabwean opposition leader, Tsvangirai called for intervention to support the quest to oust President Mugabe s authoritarian rule (Geoghegan 2008). Likewise, civil society groups in Western states may refer to the international community. For example, American activists press for the USA to join the International Criminal Court s Rome statute to allow it to support the prosecution of crimes against humanity by Sudanese officials. The activists point out that the USA has no legislation to pursue perpetrators itself lagging behind the international community s legal standards (Lesser 2008). The international community s role in domestic struggles can be real, as in the examples above, but it may also take forms of simulation. Groups at a sub-state level striving for territorial secession use a range of techniques to gain or simply simulate international support. Local groups voice interests to a broader audience using modern communication, as in the internet campaigns by Burmese activists or supporters of the Zapatistas movement in Chiapas/Mexico. In Transdniestria, creating façade organizations, false websites and reports served the political leadership of the secessionist Moldovan region to legitimize its state-building project vis-à-vis its constituency (see Isachenko in this volume). Western states may point to a diffuse international community to dilute responsibility and back off from action. In international interventions, single states tend to deflect responsibility by citing the greater political weight of multilateral engagement. Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan is a case in point; lead nations have either abandoned or handed over to other actors their failed reform efforts (see Gross in this volume). Denoted rogue states can profit from the fact that the international community is not an all-encompassing category, but a specific group of states sharing some beliefs, yet following divergent interests and priorities. Factors such as energy demand and economic interests may undermine the efforts of the international community, as with Iran where Russia and China hesitated to enforce policy against the country s nuclear ambitions (see Beck/Gerschewski in this volume). Finally, institutional interests may guide actors to position themselves in the contested fields of in- and out-group definitions. Implementation bodies such as environmental regimes secretariats may strive to get more states to sign the regimes contractual agreements, to fulfil their mandates and justify their existence (see Forster Rothbart in this volume). The institutional self-interests of organizations find their satisfaction in, but also contribute to, the ambivalence between image and practice of the international community. 3. Author s contributions The dichotomy between rhetoric and reality is misleading. Also, the paradigmatic debate between normative-universalist and empirical-particularistic approaches fails to capture the issue s complexity. The international community is both rhetoric and reality, and it is the interplay between practical politics and its discursive construction, including the different meanings assigned to it by actors, upon which one needs to focus. Approaching it from different angles, the articles shed light upon different aspects of the concept of the international community. Eva Gross examines the changing images and actors of the international community in the context of intervention and statebuilding in Afghanistan. The construction of an international community of interveners concentrated, at first, on the ideal of a broad alliance of Western and non-western states; the UN was supposed to take a leading and coordinating role. However, increasing political fragmentation and a deteriorating security situation soon reshaped the image, now meaning the political and military commitment of Western states and organizations, namely EU and NATO. This stronger emphasis on the West undermined the image of the international community and confronted the Western actors with growing legitimization problems. Concerns about an emerging anti-western counter-narrative and about the regional impact of the intervention have recently led to attempts to actively broaden the international community again by including regional actors such as Pakistan, Iran and India. Yet, as Gross observes, tensions among regional players and a lack of Western actors willingness to adopt inclusive concepts based on consensus among local, regional and international ideas indicate that simply redefining the international community will not resolve its inherent normative and practical contradictions. Martin Beck and Johannes Gerschewski describe the paradoxical situation that rogue states are simultaneously part of the international community and excluded from it: their statehood makes them part of the Westphalian system from which they are banned at the same time. Firstly, they scrutinize what leads to the labelling of states as rogues, namely authoritarianism on the internal level and/or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. On the surface, these criteria seem to be clear and easily discernible, yet they have not only been used interchangeably, but also inconsistently. Furthermore, while intended to legitimize political action, discursively excluding a state from the international community has self-entrapping implications for its members, as it impedes engagement of the rogue. Secondly, the authors reflect upon rogue states room for manoeuvre under international sanctions. Political leeway mainly arises from the paradox between political exclusion and structural inclusion. Beck and Gerschewski point to inconsistencies of the international community from which a rogue regime may profit, as ongoing multipolarization of the international system renders the making of an inclusive international community, encompassing powerful states such as China, Russia, or India increasingly difficult. Furthermore, normative inconsistencies of the international community, for example double standards of non-interference, provide rogues with arguments against the sanctioning states. Additionally, rogues profit internally from their strength vis-à-vis their society, which derives partly from structural inclusion in the world economy: states financing rule by economic or political rents S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

11 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn, The International Community enjoy a high degree of independence from societal demands and are therefore usually resistant despite coercive measures by the international community. Amy Forster Rothbart concentrates on post-soviet states membership in international environmental regimes, focussing on their ambitions to become part of and accepted by a wider international community. She distinguishes three notions of the term: Firstly, in environmental politics there is not one single international community but many overlapping ones. Divisions and competence between different members e.g. the EU and the USA, developed and developing countries, or diverse environmental institutions sometimes allowed post-soviet states to negotiate membership conditions. Secondly, the term refers to an image that new states leaders have of an in-group of sovereign states implying certain rights and privileges. Rushing to sign on to environmental treaties followed the observation that full-fledged participation in the international system exceeds formal recognition; to become substantially equal and accepted, participation in international regulation seemed crucial. Meeting international expectations regarding democratization by using the treaties as a form of democracy by association (instead of domestic institutional reforms), and a wish to present themselves as rule of law states and good global citizens not least aimed to attract foreign support and investments. While contributing to environmental protection was at most partly intended, the agreements triggered transformation in the post-soviet states as treaties had to be implemented. This is the third role the international community plays: international agencies work on the ground with state and civil society actors, assisting implementation processes and fostering domestic demand for environmental policies. Daria Isachenko elaborates on rhetoric and reality from the bottom-up perspective of the Moldovan secessionist republic of Transdniestria. She demonstrates how the image of the international community can be manipulated by local elites in internal power struggles. She distinguishes two notions: Firstly, the concept is used to legitimize political elites statebuilding project vis-à-vis their constituency and to discipline internal opposition. Creating websites, for instance, helps to simulate international support for Transdniestrian statehood, while construction of negative images of the international community triggered a rally-around-the-flag effect known from sanctioned countries (cf. Beck/Gerschewski in this volume). Secondly, the concept of international community provides orientation as structural and political context for local power struggles. The simulation of politics in Transdniestria e.g. creation of civil society groups to demonstrate democratic culture serves to align with international values. In this sense, the illusion of democracy created by Transdniestria s political leaders hardly expresses their own ideas but reflects the dominant (liberal) values of the international community itself. 4. Bibliography Annan, Kofi A. 2002, Problems Without Passports, in: Foreign Policy, 132, Bello, Walden 2002, Battling Barbarism, in: Foreign Policy, 132, Blair, Tony 1999, Doctrine of the International Community, speech by the UK Prime Minister in Chicago on 24 April 1999, ( ). Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit 2009, Staatlichkeit in Zeiten des Statebuilding, Hamburg et al. Bull, Hedley 1977, The Anarchical Society, London/Basingstoke. Buzan, Barry 1991, People, States, and Fear, Harlow et al. Buzan, Barry/Gonzalez-Pelaez, Ana 2005, International Community after Iraq, in: International Affairs, 81:1, Chomsky, Noam 2002, The Crimes of Intcom, in: Foreign Policy, 132, Cortright, David/Lopez, George A. 2002, Sanctions and the Search for Security, Boulder/London. Daase, Christopher/Feske, Susanne/Peters, Ingo 2002, Internationale Risikopolitik: Ergebnisse und Perspektiven, in: Daase/Feske/ Peters (eds), Internationale Risikopolitik, Ellis, David C. 2009, On the Possibility of International Community, in: International Studies Review, 11:1, G8 2007, Germany, Japan to cooperate closely in international affairs, en,layoutvariant=druckansicht.html ( ). Geoghegan, Andrew 2008, Tsvangirai calls for international intervention in Zimbabwe, ABC News, 23 June 2008, ( ). Giesen, Klaus-Gerd 2004, Zur Ideologie des Schurkenstaates: Rawls versus Derrida, in: Giesen (ed.), Ideologien in der Weltpolitik, Wiesbaden, Goffman, Erving 1974, Frame Analysis, New York et al. Gowers, Andrew 2002, The Power of Two, in: Foreign Policy, 132, Hehir, Bryan 2002, The Limits of Loyalty, in: Foreign Policy, 132, Jung, Dietrich 2001, The Political Sociology of World Society, in: European Journal of International Relations, 7:4, Kovach, Karen 2003, The International Community as Moral Agent, in: Journal of Military Ethics, 2:2, Kühn, Florian P. 2008, Aid, Opium and the State of Rents in Afghanistan: Competition, Cooperation, or Cohabitation?, in: Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2:3, Lebow, Richard Ned 2006, Fear, interest and honour, in: International Affairs, 82:3, Lesser, Howard 2008, Sudan Activists focus Congressional Attention on Prosecuting War Criminals, com/english/archive/ / voa5.cfm?cfid= &CFTOKEN= ( ). May, Larry 2007, The International Community, Solidarity and the Duty to Aid, in: Journal of Social Philosophy, 38:1, S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

12 Gross, Reconstructing Afghanistan T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Ogata, Sadako 2002, Guilty Parties, in: Foreign Policy, 132, Roy, Olivier 2004, Globalised Islam, London. Samuels, Kirsti 2007, Political Violence and the International Community, Leiden/Boston. Schlichte, Klaus/Veit, Alex 2007, Coupled Arenas. Why statebuilding is so difficult, Working Papers Micropolitics, 3/2007, Berlin. Tomuschat, Christian 1995, Die internationale Gemeinschaft, in: Archiv des Völkerrechts, 33:1-2, Wæver, Ole 1995, Securitization and Desecuritization, in: Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.), On Security, New York, Wedgwood, Ruth 2002, Gallant Delusions, in: Foreign Policy, 132, Reconstructing Afghanistan: Is the West eclipsing the International Community? Eva Gross* Abstract: This article considers the role of the international community in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Although the UN has a coordinating and legitimizing role, the international community has turned out to be fragmented, and the countries determining policy have predominantly been Western. Current efforts to include regional contributions do not necessarily reflect a more inclusive notion of the international community. Rather than re-investing in the notion of the international community to reach a local, regional as well as international consensus, current thinking on Afghanistan tends to highlight fragmentation of what was initially framed as a task for the international community. Keywords: Afghanistan, international community, NATO, UN, the West, Afghanistan, Internationale Gemeinschaft, NATO, UN, der Westen 1. Introduction1 After the fall of the Taliban, brought about in response to the attacks on 11 September 2001, the task of reconstructing Afghanistan was placed under UN auspices both to lend legitimacy to international efforts and to coordinate economic and political measures on the part of the various international actors involved. Present at the creation of policies towards Afghanistan, however, were two factors that facilitated international fragmentation rather than a coherent and comprehensive approach. The first was the changing nature of international coalitions: the US, rather than calling on NATO for support in its fight against the Taliban through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), relied on ad-hoc coalitions of the willing, which put into question the role and purpose of military alliances in the post-11 September era. The second was the emphasis under the penmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN s Secretary General Special Representative on a light footprint approach that emphasized Afghan involvement in setting policy priorities (House of Commons 2003). These two factors led to a severely fragmented international environment * Dr. Eva Gross, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The author wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments, and the editors for their kind invitation to participate in this special issue. This article is peer-reviewed. in which reconstruction efforts have taken place to date. In light of the deteriorating security situation, the predominant discourse on Afghanistan has focused on military and political commitments among Western actors the US and its allies, NATO, but increasingly also the EU rather than a concern with engaging the international community. These actors, which for the purpose of this article will be referred to as the West, therefore, have eclipsed the international community in discourses over how to fix Afghanistan. This article reviews changing images of the international community in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and shows that the challenge faced by NATO and other Western governments and institutions has not just led to efforts at increasing coordination but also to discussions over the potential contribution of regional actors. The article discusses this potential contribution but concludes that the formulation of a regional strategy is hampered by the heterogeneity of political and security concerns in Afghanistan s neighborhood and the lack of an overarching political strategy towards Afghanistan on the part of Western actors. It also concludes that the current discourse of a regional approach coupled with a renewed emphasis on the UN in coordinating international efforts have brought debates over engagement in Afghanistan full circle. In light of a continued Western lead in both military and ideational terms, S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

13 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Gross, Reconstructing Afghanistan however, the involvement of the international community in developing a common strategy that includes regional actors seems unlikely. 2. The international community in Afghanistan: changing images (and actors) At the outset of the US-led military intervention and international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, the image of the international community and particularly a consensus between Western, non-western and Islamic states, was given prevalence in the formulation of international policy towards Afghanistan. The UN assumed a central role in reconstruction and the creation of an interim government. At the Bonn Conference on the future of Afghanistan in December 2001, Afghan factions agreed on a transitional process leading to elections of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government (United Nations 2001) and established the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) under the leadership of Hamid Karzai who, after the presidential elections in December 2004, became the first democratically elected president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Emphasizing broad international participation, the military aspect of reconstruction by means of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the peacekeeping force assembled under the framework of UNSC Resolution 1378 was undertaken without the participation of US forces. Initially at least, NATO did not play a role in ISAF. Its involvement was blocked by several NATO countries, including France, that were not eager to see a NATO flag fly in Kabul (NATO Notes 2002). The importance attached to more than just Western presence in Kabul was also highlighted by the fact that Turkey assumed command over ISAF after the initial six-month British lead. Apart from military contributions to ISAF, individual countries have also contributed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan by assuming coordinating roles in a number of areas within Security Sector Reform (SSR): justice reform (Italy); counter narcotics (UK); police (Germany); military (USA); Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) (Japan). Initial emphasis, therefore, was on the international community and its individual rather than institutional members that were committed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. There also was an emphasis on the involvement of a Muslim country Turkey in the military efforts under ISAF; and there was an explicit emphasis on a speedy transition to Afghan ownership of the post-conflict state-building process enshrined in the light footprint concept. In practice, the international community consisted mainly of the US, the UN, key lead nations in individual policy areas, and the EU. Over time, also in light of NATO assuming command of ISAF as of August 2003, transatlantic arguments over burden sharing and a division of labor between NATO and the EU, meant that the focus increasingly shifted from ensuring broad contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan to debates over differences between alliance members over size and nature of their individual military contributions. The emphasis on the activities of the international community in the reconstruction of Afghanistan subsequently turned into debates over different levels of financial and military contributions as well as approaches towards reconstruction. The increasing fragmentation of international presence under a de facto Western lead thus came to undermine the image of the international community and the absence of an overall political strategy towards rebuilding the Afghan state further highlighted the lack of not just a Western but also an international consensus on Afghanistan. 3. Applying concepts: Western state-building and Afghan realities International intervention in Afghanistan is located in a specific ideational context that reinforces the Western material lead of military efforts: that of state failure and resulting humanitarian emergencies but also the link to international terrorism. Since the end of the Cold War the concept of failed or failing states became key in understanding how weak state structures and illegitimate governments formed preconditions for an increase in organized crime, breakdown of social structures, human rights violations and the emergence of transnational terrorist networks (Schneckener 2007). The attacks of 11 September and the emerging paradigm of the war on terror have since reinforced the conceptual connection between weak or failed states and international terrorism and have made the challenge of preventing state-failure and that of (re-)-building failed states a central concern for international crisis management policies. Security sector reform (SSR) in particular has become a key concept for improving governance in post-conflict countries (Hänggi and Tanner 2005). The lack of consensus among the international community but also among the West is also reflected in the insufficient intellectual engagement with the concepts that underpin reconstruction efforts. Western liberal conceptions of the role of the state, and the value of democracy promotion that form the overall ideational basis for state-building and post-conflict reconstruction (Jahn 2007), have turned out to be less than appropriate for the particular context in which they are placed and have further hampered moves towards the formulation of an international rather than Western-dominated strategy towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan presents a case where traditional decision-making structures and political affiliations tend to be local and not easily subsumed under the centralized, democratic state-model current reconstruction efforts are built on. While formal institutions have been established, these are not self-sustaining, with 93% of the budget continuing to be financed through external sources, thereby cementing Afghan dependence on international aid (Maas 2007; on the effect on governance Kühn 2008). With respect to SSR, the legacy of Soviet occupation and Taliban rule along with international isolation has meant that a functioning police and justice sector did not exist in Afghanistan (Wilder 2007; Thier 2004). In addition, active military operations take place alongside state- and institution-building efforts on the part of the international actors. The narcotics trade in particular fuels insurgency, corruption and state weakness. Lastly, Afghanistan s economy is recovering from decades of conflict. Despite some progress GDP per capita growth ex 80 S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

14 Gross, Reconstructing Afghanistan T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T ceeded 9% in 2007 Afghanistan remains extremely poor and most of the population continues to suffer from shortages of clean water, electricity, and medical care (World Bank 2008). The post-conflict setting, coupled with a large rural population only 24% of the population lives in cities - makes reaching the part of the population living outside of major cities challenging. Increasingly, the applicability of Western approaches to state building and post-conflict reconstruction, including the emphasis on SSR, has been put into question (Sedra 2006). Afghanistan thus challenges such concepts, which form key building blocks in the overall state-building efforts, and the attempt at establishing centralized democratic structures in an insecure location. This further undermines not just the success of international efforts but also reinforces the Western conceptual bias that underpins these efforts - and makes arriving at a local and international consensus all the more challenging. 4. Increasing fragmentation: transatlantic and intra-european differences Growing security concerns coupled with debates over alliance solidarity and military commitments soon turned out to be fragmenting not just international, but increasingly also Western efforts. It also became clear that ISAF did not succeed at filling the security vacuum left after the fall of the Taliban, and the neglect of police and justice reform together with an overall lack of military, political and economic resources invested is now universally recognized as a missed opportunity on the part of the international community. The debate over Afghanistan moved from one that emphasized involvement of the international community to one that predominantly concerned the size and nature of European contributions and the involvement of NATO. The war in Afghanistan clearly redefined NATO s role, and most public debate centered on the challenge posed to NATO, as well as the nature of military contributions. Essentially, Afghanistan was a US-led intervention, and US predominance in determining the political parameters of international engagement also extended to reconstruction tasks, as the US continues to far outspend the Europeans in military commitments, police reform and development aid (Korski 2008). Differences across the Atlantic, but also within Europe, continue to centre on the establishment of viable governance structures in an environment with high levels of corruption, a growing narcotics trade and insufficient economic development. Police reform in particular has become one of the key priorities in efforts at establishing the rule of law. European efforts at SSR, specifically EU contributions to reforming the Afghan National Police (ANP), further illustrate the extent of transatlantic differences in both material and ideational terms. Since June 2007, police reform has been Europeanized through the European Police Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan) that took over from the German Police Project Office (GPPO) the task of advising the ANP on reform efforts and of coordinating the international partner contributions. EUPOL Afghanistan is embedded in the larger EU commitment to Afghanistan. This includes the appointment of an EU Special Representative and financial contributions from the European Commission, which has given some EUR 135 million to the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) that pays for police salaries since 2002; and has allocated more than EUR 10 million to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that support a range of European projects in different parts of the country (Council of the European Union 2007). But, a significant discrepancy in resources committed between the US and the EU in the field of police reform reinforces the fragmentation among Western actors. Compared to that of the United States, another key actor in police reform with 500 contracted police trainers, 750 military personnel and $2 billion in funding in particular, the size of the EU s commitment is comparatively small. What is more, the underlying philosophy on police training differs: US training has focused on equipment and rapid training rather than emphasizing institutional reform in favor of more accountability. Different conceptions of the role and purpose of the security sector, and different underlying conceptions of the task to be accomplished institution-building on the part of the EU and the contextualization of efforts as part of the broader war on terror on the part of the US are thus reproduced in specific tasks and aspects of statebuilding on the ground. The contradictions and differences among the West are also visible in so far as emphasis tends to be on NATO s military efforts and on transatlantic burden sharing. This results from the widely different level of funding committed to military deployment as opposed to civilian reconstruction efforts. Beyond emphasizing the military over development and institution-building efforts, highlighting different levels of commitment reinforces the fragmentation among members of the transatlantic alliance. In the discourse on international interventions NATO takes predominance - but increasingly seeks to rely on other actors, notably the EU but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in its pursuit of a comprehensive approach that fuses military and civilian instruments (Jakobsen 2008). 5. Changing narratives in rescue of the West : from light footprint to coordination Within Western US, European, EU and NATO efforts, therefore, different and evolving narratives and scripts of the West and its various contributions to post-conflict reconstruction exist. Notably, these narratives have been predominantly that of NATO. The alliance fundamentally shifted its role in response to the presumed choice between out of area or out of business in light of post-11 September security priorities. Increasing challenges to NATO s success in Afghanistan, due to the growing insurgency in addition to the drug trade and its various effects on government legitimacy and security, meant that the success of NATO and debates over alliance solidarity became prevalent in the discourse on Afghanistan. The emphasis on the international community was thus replaced with that of solidarity within the Western alliance. Operational experience gathered in this particular mission, however, led NATO to attempt to re-brand itself into an institution concerned with more than providing military security, but one that could deliver a comprehensive approach that fuses security and development. This in turn raised the issue over competition with the S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

15 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Gross, Reconstructing Afghanistan EU, and the compatibility of military and non-governmental or humanitarian actors. More broadly, it also shows that in the conceptualization of its new role and doctrine in Afghanistan, NATO assumed leadership in areas military, civilian and developmental that were previously to be shared among the international community. Partly as a result of NATO assuming the lead in debates over security and development also in light of its lead in both material as well as conceptual commitments the role of the UN, although it was entrusted with coordinating efforts, has not been very visible. Therefore, discussion continues to centre around European and transatlantic efforts and how they support the UN rather than on prominence of the UN and the international community. The UN continues to be a legitimizing actor, but it is not an actor that sets or coordinates policy rather, the debate shifted towards that of a division of labor between Western governments and institutional actors. However, the deteriorating security situation and the resulting risk of failure of international efforts in Afghanistan have effected a rethinking of the nature and strength of international involvement. Efforts have moved away from the light footprint as a guiding principle, not just with respect to international involvement but also to increasing coordination with the Afghan government. The 2006 Afghanistan Compact, which followed the end of the Bonn process, emphasized partnership between the Afghan government and international institutions; and, through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), seeks to work toward a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and human rights protection for all under the rule of law, which indicates a move away from the light footprint towards a focus on accountability (Ayub and Kuovo 2008). The lack of progress in establishing functioning and legitimate government structures has also resulted in increasing attention to the quest for coherence and the formulation of a coordinated political strategy (Centre for the Study of the Presidency 2008), which points towards efforts to unite Western agendas. Giving the UN a stronger coordinating role signals a move towards a more concerted engagement of the UN. This has been reaffirmed by the appointment of Kai Eide as UN Special Representative in Afghanistan in 2008 although the decision not to appoint a personality with a higher international profile has put into question the extent to which the coordination role will be put into practice. 6. Regional and geo-strategic perspectives: bringing the region back in Aside from confronting difficulties in reconciling different conceptions and approaches towards Afghanistan, Western actors have increasingly looked beyond Afghanistan and their own engagement in the country to explore the impact, but also the potential role, of regional actors in Afghanistan. The parallel discourses over encouraging Afghan ownership in reconstruction and development and of involving regional actors in the quest of an Asian solution to Afghanistan, signals a broadening of thinking in how to approach Afghanistan. The question of how international intervention in Afghanistan fits the geographically more immediate local and regional context has become more important. Attempts to involve regional actors in Afghanistan serve a dual purpose of being able to scale down Western commitments, but also to legitimize Western efforts towards a regional solution. Particularly noticeable is the increasing attempt to link efforts on Afghanistan with those on Pakistan at the political level, especially on the part of the US. Moving from the international community to the regional community involves conceptualizing an approach towards Pakistan, and to a lesser extent also Iran. It further involves emphasis on greater involvement by India, albeit without offsetting a regional balance as the strengthening of India-Afghanistan ties has been regarded with distrust by Pakistan (Kumar 2008). In the aftermath of the Mumbai bombings and tense relations between the two countries, constructive cooperation with respect to Afghanistan seems unlikely in the near term. With respect to Iran, the unwillingness of the previous US administration to engage in direct talks with Iran harms the formulation of joint policies (or even the exploration of such potential). The extent to which the new US administration will depart from previous approaches of non-engagement remains to be seen, although the signs so far have been encouraging. Although the centrality of Pakistan to a stable Afghanistan has been recognized, weak state structures signal not just that Pakistan is some way away from playing a constructive role. Combined with US military engagement in Pakistan and the continued emphasis on the war on terror and increasing military commitments without a political strategy, engagement with Pakistan also shows that engaging Afghanistan s immediate neighbors is hampered by state weakness and broader geopolitical but also ideational positions by what continues to be the primary actor: the US. Despite the increasing conceptualization of Afghanistan as part of a broader regional complex, where regional countries in the immediate neighborhood can make a contribution, there is little to suggest a radical break from practice to date. More than fostering a regional, let alone international, consensus or a broader view of how to approach security, institution-building and development in Afghanistan, these efforts continue to be based on a Western lead in reconstruction efforts both in material and ideational terms. This is partly out of necessity, as the regional actors in question those in Afghanistan s immediate neighborhood including Pakistan, India, Iran and the Central Asian Republics; and those in the wider region, including China and Russia do not form a coherent regional block that would either facilitate or assume some Western tasks in Afghanistan s reconstruction. But it is also because the overall approach to reconstruction continues to be not just placed in Western hands, but also based on Western concepts. International efforts continue to overwhelmingly mean Western efforts rather than those based on a local, regional and international consensus on approaches to Afghanistan. 82 S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

16 Gross, Reconstructing Afghanistan T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T 7. Conclusion: towards community, coordination and strategy? Much of the international and Western confusion and fragmentation reflects the fact that these policies were created in a time of shock and crisis; the enduring fragmentation of efforts reflects ongoing debates on post-9/11 realities, and disagreements among principal actors in Afghanistan s reconstruction. This resulted in a lack of community - but also of strategy. Despite a degree of operational re-orientation as far as emphasizing accountability and coordination is concerned, this has not fundamentally altered the international approach to Afghanistan. Importantly, much of the debate over Western intervention was not about Afghanistan or Afghan realities. Rather, the debate tended to reflect fundamentally Western priorities over the future of its own institutions, and the relation of individual Western institutions and governments towards one another. The quest for the continued relevance of NATO, coupled with the dispute over the division of labor between NATO and the EU, often eclipsed the needs on the ground in Afghanistan and beyond. In light of an increasing emphasis on Afghanistan and the questions of governance, rule of law and economic development, international and Western efforts have come full circle to once again emphasize Afghan ownership, but with a stronger engagement of international actors and with greater emphasis on accountability. An additional difference is that present circumstances are far more challenging, given the changing international environment and the increasing strategic challenges inherent in a re-emerging Taliban and enduring al Qaeda activities. While the West is finally addressing the need for a comprehensive strategy, the involvement of all relevant actors and the linkages between security, politics and economic development, conditions on the ground are such that an improvement in the short term at least is questionable. In addition, current debates do not constitute a radical break from past assumptions and approaches. Despite ongoing debates over a renewed focus on Afghanistan and over the need for a political strategy, the extent to which Afghanistan will turn into a concern for the international community as a whole remains doubtful. Jahn, Beate 2007, The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part II), in: Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1:2, Jakobsen, Peter Viggo 2008, NATO s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress, DIIS Report 2008:15, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 8 October. Korski, Daniel 2008, Afghanistan: Europe s Forgotten War, London, European Council on Foreign Relations, January. Kühn, Florian P. 2008, Aid, Opium and the State of Rents in Afghanistan: Competition, Cooperation, or Cohabitation?, in: Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2:3, Kumar, Radha 2008, Afghanistan a regional perspective, Issues 27, Paris, EU Institute for European Studies, October. Maas, Citha 2007, Afghanistan: Staatsaufbau ohne Staat, SWP Studie, February. NATO Notes 2002, Afghanistan: Still Too out of area for NATO?, 19 December. Schneckener, Ulrich 2007, International Statebuilding: Dilemmas, Strategies and Challenges for German Foreign Policy, SWP Research Paper 2007/RP 09, Berlin, October. Sedra, Mark 2006, European Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Examining Trends through the Lens of Afghanistan, in: European Security 15:3, Thier, Alexander 2004, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, CDDRL Working Papers 19:1, Stanford University, 1 September. United Nations 2001, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of permanent government institutions (Bonn Agreement), 7 December, ( ). Wilder, Andrew 2007, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, Issue Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), July. World Bank 2008, Afghanistan at a Glance, Washington DC, 24 September. 8. Bibliography Ayub, Fatima/ Kuovo, Sari 2008, Afghanistan: intervention and the war on terror, in: International Affairs 84:4, Centre for the Study of the Presidency 2008, Afghanistan Study Group Report: Revitalizing our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies, 30 January. Council of the European Union 2007, Factsheet: EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN), May. Hänggi, Heiner/Tanner, Fred 2005, Promoting security sector governance in the EU s neighbourhood, Chaillot Paper 80, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies. House of Commons 2003, Afghanistan: The Transition from Humanitarian Relief to Reconstruction and Development, London, 14 January. S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

17 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Beck/Gerschewski, On the Fringes of the International Community On the Fringes of the International Community: The Making and Survival of Rogue States Martin Beck* and Johannes Gerschewski** Abstract: Studies on rogue states often present normative analyses focused on the perspective of Western actors. From a purely analytical point of view, the present article steps away from this tradition and aims to examine the process of designating actors as rogue states, its impact on them, and their capabilities to defy stigmatization. The argument developed proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the paper discloses and discusses characteristic features of states that lead to them being labeled rogue states. Thereby the paradoxical situation occurs that rogue states can be seen either as a part of the international community or as an entity being excluded from this community. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the selection process of rogue states is based on biased securitization policies. Secondly, despite being exposed to significant external pressure, most rogue states have shown a remarkable resistance to transforming their political conduct. Two main sources of strength are identified: the ability of rogue states to draw material and ideational resources from the international system and their disposal over state capacities. Keywords: Rogue states, pariah states, stigmatization, transformation resistance, authoritarian states Schurkenstaaten/Pariastaaten, Stigmatisierung, Transformationsresistenz autoritärer Staaten 1. Introduction 1 The term international community implies a global unit be it composed of people or entities governing them. Yet, there are some actors that are excluded from this community, or at least some states of the global community aspire to this exclusion. This leads to the paradoxical situation that rogue states are simultaneously part of the international community and excluded from it: Their statehood makes them part of the Westphalian system from which they are banned at the same time (see Saunders 2006). The aim of this article is to study both the process of selection of these outcasts, commonly referred to as rogue states, and their ability to survive despite being dismissed by (the most powerful actors of) the international community. The argument developed in the present article will proceed in two steps. Firstly, the article aims to identify characteristic features of states that lead to them being labeled rogue states. What makes a state a rogue state ; what are the selection criteria; how are these criteria applied; and, above all, in what (security-related) political context is the designation embedded? To start with, the basic question of whether and how the term rogue state should be used in the academic arena is to be addressed. It is emphasized that the selection of rogue states is based on (biased) securitization policies. Secondly, the patterns of external pressure imposed on rogue states will be analyzed in more detail. Despite being exposed to significant external pressure, most rogue states have shown a remarkable resistance to transforming their political conduct. Thus, the issue of available structural resources for rogue states to maintain PD Dr. Martin Beck, Senior Research Fellow at GIGA, Institute of Middle East Studies, Hamburg, Germany; Johannes Gerschewski, MA, PhD Candidate at Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany. This article is peerreviewed. 1 We want to thank the two anonymous referees of Security and Peace for their constructive comments. Moreover, we are grateful to the members of the GIGA Research Team on Pariah States for stimulating us to write the article and commenting on it: Matthias Basedau, Marco Bünte, Henner Fürtig, Bert Hoffmann and Steffen Stübig. stability despite stigmatization and exclusion from the international community needs to be analyzed. This will be done by focusing on the most widespread and arguably most effective instrument for influencing states behavior in the internatio- nal system, i.e. sanctions. It will be argued that the mainstream literature on the impact of sanctions tends to underestimate internatio both the significant changes taking place in the international system and the central role of the state as a donjon for rogues. More specifically, we emphasize two main sources of strength: the ability of rogue states to draw material and ideational resources out of the international system and their disposal over state capacities. 2. The concept of rogue state 2.1 To use or not to use the term rogue state in academic analyses In general, the concept of rogue states is highly controversial. Whereas some argue that the term is sufficiently defined by convention, highlighting specific state behavior (for external behavior: see Segell 2004: 343; for internal behavior: Caprioli/ Trumbore 2003: 378-9), critics emphasize that it represents a politicized term that lacks analytical power (Litwak 2000: 74-90; 2001: ) and should therefore be avoided (Thompson 2002: 21). Nevertheless, use of this label increased in recent years and has become a common and popular term in the language of US foreign policy. Certainly, the term rogue state is not born out of a sophisticated theoretical design. Rather, it is a fighting word of actors aiming to delegitimize others, that is, to stigmatize states on behalf of the international community. Yet, this fact should be taken as an argument for using the term rogue states in academic debates (in inverted commas). Labeling an actor as rogue state is a political speech act with often far-reaching implications, both for the sending state s options and the tar 84 S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

18 Beck/Gerschewski, On the Fringes of the International Community T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T geted actor s political behavior. Thus, banning the term from academic discourse would abet ignorance of a genuine research object for political science. 2.2 Rogue States and the politics of securitization There are several, almost synonymous, terms such as renegade regimes, pariah states, states of concern, or problem states that imply a pejorative connotation with regard to the stigmatized actor. Although the term rogue state has been invented fairly recently, it should be emphasized that the social phenomenon of states standing aloof of a more or less broader international community or being made aloof by this community is not new; it ranges from the Vandals challenging the boundaries of the Roman Empire to the Leninist Soviet Union and Germany s Nazi government to the pariah states of the Cold War, such as South Africa or Taiwan (Henriksen 2001: ; Nincic 2005: 9-12). Yet, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the historical coining of the term rogue state because it shows the particularities of a specific policy of securitization (see Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998). The term rogue regime was first made public in a Washington Post editorial in 1979 when Pol Pot s Cambodia and Idi Amin s Uganda were accused of severe human rights violations against their own people. In this context, Litwak (2000: 47-56; 2001: 377) underscores that the term rogue state in its original sense referred to repressive internal behavior by a state. This focus on internal politics gradually shifted to aggressive foreign policy that (allegedly) poses a security threat to the international community in general, and the West and the US in specific. As is characteristic for policies of securitization, such a policy enables the sender to embark on far-reaching actions that would otherwise be difficult to legitimize. Thus, when the US began to list state sponsors of terrorism in 1979, the usage of the term rogue state was closely intertwined with the imposition of sanctions (Litwak 2001: ). This is especially so today, as, besides the terrorism argument, a further key rogue state criterion since the 1980s has been the acquisition or development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The Reagan administration was preoccupied with the challenge of proliferation. This pending issue has gained an inner dynamic in the last two decades. Consequently, O Reilly (2007: ) has found that in more than 80 percent of the cases between 1993 and 2004, rogue states were accused of acquiring or developing WMDs, leading to a security threat, and showing irresponsible behavior. Internal dimensions such as repression or misconduct by the government were only of secondary importance The double-edged sword of stigmatization politics When Clinton tried in 2000 to alter and soften the term rogue state into states of concern and Bush, who initially took a harder stance, changed the term into problem states in 2005, the dilemma underlying this term was obvious. When reinforced by the shift from internal towards international deviant behavior, the classification of an actor as rogue state is a powerful instrument. It enables a government to impose sanctions on the recipient state. As proven by the example of Saddam Hussein s Iraq, the policy of declaring a state a rogue state may even enable a state to wage war. But such stigmatizing policy also limits the political leeway. Engaging a rogue regime represents an almost impossible option if a government needs to avoid being accused of promoting appeasement policies (Litwak 2001). This dilemma became evident during the first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, when only a private mission by former US president Carter to North Korea could end the vicious circle of mounting tensions between the Clinton administration and the regime of Kim Jong II. Because the US government was unable to appease a rogue, this spiral could have led even to US military intervention in Also in the second nuclear crisis, which began in 2002, the US held itself back to fully engage in negotiations due to its usual reserve in dealing with a rogue. It remains to be seen to what extent Washington s decision to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors in October 2008 contributes to a lasting normalization of their relationship. Against this backdrop, stigmatizing a state as a rogue state often turns out to be a self-entrapment for a government. It offers a gateway to lobby groups to interfere in foreign policies. Contrary to realist assumptions of high politics as the prerogative of governments, national policies towards a rogue state are sometimes transferred into an issue dealt with by actors on the societal level. Moreover, as in other ideologically loaded arenas, political arguments and decisions tend to be based on principles rather than pragmatic considerations. For example, one of the arguments for sanctioning the regime in Damascus presented in the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) was the fact that contrary to other actors put on the US-list of state sponsors of terrorism it had previously been spared from sanctions The selection of rogue states The list of state sponsors of terrorism established in 1979 created a basic reference point for US policy towards rogue states. Among the first to be placed on this list were Libya and Syria; other prominent outcasts such as Cuba (1982), Iran (1984), and North Korea (1988) followed. After being placed on the list once, the continuity with which these regimes have been labeled rogues is striking. O Reilly (2007: 305) has examined the public statements of key US foreign policy decision makers from 1993 to 2004 and found that Iraq (54 mentions), 2 See also the National Security Strategy of the USA, 2002, available at: SALSA is available at S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

19 T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T Beck/Gerschewski, On the Fringes of the International Community Iran (49), North Korea (34), Libya (21), and Syria (3) are the main rogues. In addition, Burma/Myanmar, China, Cuba, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe were each mentioned once. In general, two main criteria for designating a rogue state are frequently emphasized in both politics and political discourses. Firstly, there is the internal appearance as states governed by autocratic, repressive regimes. Actually, there can be hardly any doubt that all rogue states are authoritarian. Additionally, Tanter (1998: 6-24) accentuates the prominent role of charismatic leaders. Secondly, rogue states are accused of posing a security threat as they actively pursue WMD. 4 This criterion has gained importance in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, Particularly US foreign policy is accused of selecting the rogue states almost arbitrarily. Applying both criteria in a coherent manner, however, helps to avoid premature assessments of biased selectivity in the process of designating rogue states. For example, although India and Israel have acquired nuclear weapons, they have never been considered rogue states because of the democratic character of their regimes. At the same time, many states may simply be considered not worthwhile of being listed as rogue states because their weapons arsenal is harmless to Western actors. Nondemocratic countries such as Bhutan, Guinea, Thailand, and Tunisia may serve as examples. Moreover, Libya was only removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism after having renounced its program of developing WMDs. Thus, despite its continuous authoritarian rule, Libya no longer met both rogue state criteria. However, there are two groups of countries that indicate a selection bias in the designation process of rogue states. Firstly, some actors such as Cuba and Burma/Myanmar have been selected as rogues although they are not at the forefront of actors attempting to acquire a strong arsenal of WMD. Secondly, there are some countries that meet both criteria of rogue states without having been targeted as such. Pakistan is a current example and Iraq an intriguing historical one. Iraq was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism between 1982 and In this case, the readiness of being a foe of a US enemy was sufficient for it to be reintegrated into the civilized world : Saddam Hussein appeared as the only local actor able to contain the revolutionary ambitions of Iran. Although the Pakistani regime is both authoritarian and holds nuclear weapons, it serves US interests in its attempts to contain terrorism. 2.5 Splits in the West As emphasized by Schmittchen and Stritzel (2008), the term rogue regime has been widely circulated in American newspapers and official statements, whereas it is avoided by German politicians and all German political parties agree that the term has to be considered as being highly problematic. Furthermore, 4 Caprioli and Trumbore (2003) indicate a nexus between these two prima facie heterogeneous criteria by arguing that the internal behavior of a regime in terms of discrimination and violence against its own people significantly increases the use of force in an interstate conflict. Although the correlation is much weaker than the one the theorem of democratic peace is based on, authoritarian regimes actually face much less, if any, internal pressure to refrain from using (inappropriate) violence in their external affairs. German media tend to refer to rogue states not in order to label certain states but rather to describe the focal points of US foreign policy. Minnerop (2004: ) demonstrates that within the member states of the EU only the UK follows the language coined by the US; France openly rejects the term rogue state. Yet, the international community is split not only in its usage of language but also in its approaches towards these autocratic regimes. Actually, different speech acts constitute different policies. At the same time, the split in the West reflects a conflict over means rather than ends. European actors share US concerns that WMD should not fall into the hands of regimes that might threaten Western actors and their allies, respectively. Yet, on the basis of its identity as a civilian power, the EU in principle prefers dialogue-oriented policies to sanctions (Maull 2000). For example, before and even after the US had indexed Iran as a member of the axis of evil in early 2002, the EU in general and Germany in particular pursued its critical dialogue with the regime in Tehran. Thereby, the EU was not driven by the belief that the Iranian regime per se meets the criteria of a Western ally. Rather, the critical dialogue was meant to strengthen reform-oriented segments of the Iranian regime. Only after the election of extremist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iranian president in 2005 did the EU align itself with the American course External pressure and the survival of the rogues Most rogue states have shown a remarkable resistance to transition despite heightened and lasting external pressure. In the following, the stigmatization process of being labeled a rogue state will be subsumed in the wider context of the research on sanctions. Sanctions are broadly defined as mechanisms to change deviant state behavior by imposing pressure (see Peuckert 2006: 245). Generally, the research on sanctions offers quantitative studies on the effectiveness of sanctions (most notably Hufbauer et al. 2007; critical: Pape 1997) as well as a broad range of in-depth (single) case studies, but lacks comparative analyses in which context factors are taken into closer account. This deficit leads to divergent, even contradictory predictions on the effects of sanctions. To structure the debate on the sanctions effects, we propose two levels of analysis that should be distinguished for analytical reasons. Firstly, the international level should be considered. Particularly in respect to stigmatization, the extent to which the targeted regime is internationally delegitimized and isolated should be examined. Secondly, the internal dimension of the sanctioned country must be addressed. Thereby, we start with a critical discussion of the academic literature on rogue states, then add an aspect that is basically neglected by the mainstream: statehood as a stronghold of rogue regimes. 5 Ahmadinejad s election may be perceived as a failure of both the European and the US approach. From the first perspective, it proved that the soft European approach towards Iran was naive. According to the latter, it was the aggressive US policy towards Iran that weakened moderate segments of the regime in Tehran. 86 S+F (27. Jg.) 2/2009

20 Beck/Gerschewski, On the Fringes of the International Community T H E M E N S C H W E R P U N K T 3.1 The effects of stigmatization International delegitimization Being labeled as a rogue obviously has consequences in the international arena. To stigmatize a certain state behavior as deviant to international norms aims at isolating the respective regime internationally and at keeping them outside the boundaries of normal international politics (Saunders 2006: 28). From a constructivist viewpoint, Klotz (1995: ) illustrates the effects of imposing sanctions on a state. By examining the case of South Africa, she discusses effects of external pressure which constitute constraints for a rogue state to unfold its military, economic, social, and political potentials on the regional and international level. However, it has to be stated that these international norms which are allegedly violated by rogue states cannot be seen as fixed. Rather, their development should be regarded as being subject to certain life cycles and as an open process in which states may act as norm entrepreneurs and in which sanctioned states can also systematically try to undermine the legitimacy of coercive measures, as the case of Libya has recently shown (Hurd 2005; see also Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Saunders 2006). Nevertheless, combined with the underlying idea of isolating the rogue internationally, this labeling is used to gain international support for the sender s policy, which can be of importance as multilateral sanctions are generally characterized as being more effective than unilaterally imposed measures. This is mainly due to the fact that the political and economic leeway of the targeted regime is narrowed when a broad coalition of senders is involved (for a critical discussion see Kaempfer/Lowenberg 1999 and Drezner 2000) Do sanctions strengthen or weaken the targeted regime? On the internal level of the targeted state, the research on sanctions highlights two contrary effects. On the one hand, an impact that is counterproductive from the perspective of the sender is observable: the rally-around-the-flag effect which strengthens the sanctioned regime unintentionally. On the other hand, most researchers are confident that the original political aim of weakening the ruling regime is (partially) achieved. The rally-around-the-flag effect (Galtung 1983) is the most prominent effect noted by opponents of coercive measures. The argument is that the imposition of pressure leads to unintended counter-pressure and ultimately has stabilizing effects on the target country. Nincic (2005: ) differentiates in this context between an ideological and an economic dimension. The tendency to stick together when under pressure can be instrumentalized by the political elite to strengthen social cohesion. In this context, external pressure constitutes ideal circumstances for ideological reinterpretation. As most ideologies are based on a dichotomous distinction between good and evil, the external pressure can be seen as a self-reinforcing phenomenon used by the regime elite, either as a scapegoat factor for economic decline, as seen in North Korea, or as a means to produce diffuse support by strengthening national identity, as seen in almost all rogue states. In the Iranian case the regime acquires legitimacy by actively presenting itself as an ideological alternative to Western capitalism and liberal democracy. Furthermore, according to Nincic s (2005: ) line of reasoning, contrary to the original sender s strategy, sanctions tend to create a symbiosis of the regime with economic elites that benefit from sanctions, particularly operators of black market activities. Recent research on sanctions concentrates on the concept of smart sanctions (Cortright/Lopez 2002). After the problematic experiences in Iraq in the 1990s, where the civilian population was hit hard by UN-imposed sanctions, the mainstream reaction in politics and research alike was to make sanctions smarter in order to minimize the affection of groups non-affiliated with the ruling regime. However, although most scholars actually agree that the classical view, according to which the effects of sanctions are evaluated on the basis of their overall negative effect on the targeted country, is obsolete, no consensus exists whether innocent bystanders should be spared from the effects of sanctions under all circumstances. Rather, Major and McGann (2005: ) argue that the opposite may sometimes hold true. Based on the assumption that the proper aim of sanctions is a policy alteration rather than punishing the regime, innocent bystanders may be an appropriate target if they are in the position to put effective pressure on the regime. However, a minimum of pluralism is required to make such a mechanism work. Yet, as we show in the next paragraph, the degree to which the ruling elites of rogue states control the political system is not to be underestimated. 3.2 Neglected categories for analyzing rogue states Although the literature discussed above is enriching our knowledge on sanctions and their impact on target countries, it appears to us that the mainstream tends to neglect some important aspects that would lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the issue. Firstly, the effect of international delegitimization needs to be put in perspective. Secondly, the understanding of the state s relations with both the international community and its own society should be redesigned The rogue state in the international system The ability of the rogue state to draw strength out of the international system should be reconsidered. Thereby, two aspects must be taken into account, one of which is related to power, the other of which is based on ideas. After the end of the Cold War a unipolar system under US hegemony emerged that would remain in effect for the rest of the twentieth century. Accelerated by the immediate reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US managed to gather other Western actors, especially the EU, behind it. Still, contrary to the war in Afghanistan in 2001, the one waged against Iraq in 2003 brought to light some cracks in the West S+F (27. Jg.) 2/

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