Netzwerke und Sicherheit auf mobilen Geräten

Transkript

1 Netzwerke und Sicherheit auf mobilen Geräten Univ.-Prof. Priv.-Doz. DI Dr. René Mayrhofer Antrittsvorlesung Johannes Kepler Universität Linz Repräsentationsräume 1. Stock (Uni-Center) , 16:00

2 Mobile devices proliferate 2

3 Problems Wireless communication cryptography No (capable) user interfaces no passwords Scalability of user attention unobtrusive, intuitive 3

4 One approach for D2D authentication: Shaking 4

5 Accelerometer data R. Mayrhofer and H. Gellersen, Shake well before use: Intuitive and secure pairing of mobile devices, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 8, pp , June

6 Data analysis R. Dieter Findling, Muaaz, M., Hintze, D., and Mayrhofer, R., ShakeUnlock: Securely Unlock Mobile Devices by Shaking them Together, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

7 Protocol local data key agreement phase 1 auth. key exchange comparator remote data y/n session key phase 2 key agreement auth. key session key remote data exchange comparator y/n local data R. Mayrhofer and H. Gellersen, Shake well before use: Intuitive and secure pairing of mobile devices, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 8, pp , June

8 Results: Security vs. usability Devices in one hand Devices in hand + on wrist R. D. Findling, Muaaz, M., Hintze, D., and Mayrhofer, R., ShakeUnlock: Securely Unlock Mobile Devices by Shaking them Together, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

9 Mobile devices and users 9

10 Problems 10

11 Mobile devices and users 11

12 Biometric authentication: 3D Face R. D. Findling, F. Wenny, C. Holzmann, and R. Mayrhofer, Range face segmentation: Face detection and segmentation for authentication in mobile device range images, in Proc. MoMM 2013, pp R. D. Findling and R. Mayrhofer, Towards pan shot face unlock: Using biometric face information from different perspectives to unlock mobile devices, International Journal of Pervasive Computing and Communications (IJPCC), vol. 9, pp ,

13 Mobile devices and users 13

14 Biometric authentication: Iris 14

15 Biometric authentication: Gait M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

16 Data analysis M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

17 Walk separation M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

18 Data analysis M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

19 Cycle length estimation M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

20 Data analysis M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

21 Walk cycle comparison M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

22 Results Gait is not enough for high security 7,05% equal error rate on same day 18,97% equal error rate when trained on one day and tested on another research still ongoing Will require library of biometric methods M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, Orientation Independent Cell Phone Based Gait Authentication, in Proc. MoMM 2014, pp

23 Mobile devices and users 23

24 Open security problem: Secure user interaction R. Mayrhofer, An architecture for secure mobile devices, Security and Communication Networks, 2014 (AID SEC1028). 24

25 Networks and Security Hardware Virtualisation Cryptography High latency VPN Self healing Security Networks Reliable code Wireless Ad-hoc P2P Authentication Privacy 25

26 Mobile communication 26

27 Communication protocol layers Web browser Web server Internet protocols (TCP, IP) Internet protocols (TCP, IP) IEEE UMTS /GSM Ethernet Ethernet 27

28 Communication protocol layers Web browser Web server Internet protocols (TCP, IP) Internet protocols (TCP, IP) IEEE UMTS /GSM IEEE Ethernet Ethernet 28

29 Communication protocol layers Web browser Web server Internet protocols (TCP, IP) Internet protocols (TCP, IP) IEEE UMTS /GSM Ethernet 29

30 Encryption layer Web browser Web server TLS / HTTPS TLS / HTTPS Internet protocols (TCP, IP) Internet protocols (TCP, IP) IEEE UMTS /GSM Ethernet 30

31 Problem: re-connect 31

32 Problem: re-connect Web browser Web server TLS / HTTPS TLS / HTTPS Internet protocols (TCP, IP) Internet protocols (TCP, IP) IEEE UMTS /GSM Ethernet 32

33 Next steps: long-range communication latency 33

34 Future: How far can the (secure) Internet go? 34