SmartGrid Security. Jörn Müller-Quade, KASTEL, FZI, KIT. kastel.kit.edu KOMPETENZZENTRUM FÜR ANGEWANDTE SICHERHEITSTECHNOLOGIE

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1 SmartGrid Security Jörn Müller-Quade, KASTEL, FZI, KIT KOMPETENZZENTRUM FÜR ANGEWANDTE SICHERHEITSTECHNOLOGIE KIT Universität des Landes Baden-Württemberg und nationales Forschungszentrum in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft kastel.kit.edu

2 EnergyLab2.0 a Testbed Infrastructure Bild / KIT / Jülich / DLR Energy Lab 2.0 a Testbed Will become a testbed for sec

3 Energy Lab 2.0: Dealing with Renewables

4 Energy Lab 2.0 is multimodal (BioLiq) Multimodal: transforming different forms of energy. More than SmartGrid

5 We strongly rely on ICT Area of interests Critical Infrastructures Power grid ICT can be attacked ICT grid data center

6 Stuxnet, a subtle attack Subtly disturbing the system

7 Wars of the Future Future Will be fought on the econimic level Cybersecurity is vital for our economy and society We have to consider -Hackerpyramid 7 We even have to consider government level attacks

8 Do we trust in our IT Systems? 8

9 No: even the Experts have failed Why? 9

10 IT Secuity is highly non-trivial (probabilistic vs. malicious) 10 Error correcting codes protect against random errors Digital signatures protect against any (malicious) change in a document.

11 IT Secuity is highly non-trivial (probabilistic vs. malicious) IT Security cannot be tested 11 Error correcting codes protect against random errors Digital signatures protect against any (malicious) change in a document.

12 IT Security is non-trivial A magnetic stripe can be copied CC license : Christian 'VisualBeo' Horvat 12 IKS / EISS

13 Case Study EC-Cards A magnetic stripe can be copied A digital signature on a fresh challenge authenticates CC license : Christian 'VisualBeo' Horvat 13 IKS / EISS

14 Case Study EC-Cards A magnetic stripe can be copied A digital signature on a fresh challenge authenticates In case the chip is not working, fallback on magnetic stripe CC license : Christian 'VisualBeo' Horvat 14 IKS / EISS

15 Case Study EC-Cards A magnetic stripe can be copied A digital signature on a fresh challenge authenticates In case the chip is not working, fallback on magnetic stripe An attacker copies the magnetic stripe and disables it s own chip CC license : Christian 'VisualBeo' Horvat 15 IKS / EISS

16 Case Study EC-Cards A magnetic stripe can be copied A digital signature on a fresh challenge authenticates In case the chip is not Insecure: working, the two fallback on magnetic stripe measures taken cancel out. An attacker copies the magnetic stripe and disables it s own chip CC license : Christian 'VisualBeo' Horvat 16 IKS / EISS

17 17 IKS / EISS Conventional IT security has failed

18 What can I know? 18

19 Why are we sure there is a Higgs Boson? 19

20 Why are we sure there is a Higgs Boson? Why are we sure planet Neptun exists?

21 Why are we sure there is a Higgs Boson? Why are we sure planet Neptun exists? Why are we sure pi is not a fraction?

22 t It is logically reducable to falsifiable assumtptions 22

23 Are we sure this Token is secure? Blind trust

24 Are we sure this Token is secure? Blind trust

25 Cryptography as a Paradigm for Cybersecurity Models Assumptions Proofs 25

26 Cryptography more than ciphers Cointoss via Telephone Impossible? Using a telephone book or cryptography? Cryptography can solve the paradox! 26

27 Cryptography more than ciphers Blurry Box Software protection following Kerkhoffs principle [0 10) [10 20) [20 25) [25 50) [50 78) 27 usw.

28 Real Systems are Complex User Anwendung Netzwerk Endgeräte L 4 Physical Layer 28

29 Real Systems are Complex User Anwendung Netzwerk Endgeräte L 4 Physical Layer Hardware trojans 29

30 Real Systems are Complex User Anwendung Netzwerk Endgeräte L 4 Zero-Day-Exploits Physical Layer Hardware trojans 30

31 Real Systems are Complex User Anwendung Netzwerk Endgeräte L 4 Insecure protocols Zero-Day-Exploits Physical Layer Hardware trojans 31

32 Real Systems are Complex User Anwendung Application security often not defined Netzwerk Endgeräte L 4 Insecure protocols Zero-Day-Exploits Physical Layer Hardware trojans 32

33 Real Systems are Complex User Human errors Anwendung Application security often not defined Netzwerk Endgeräte L 4 Insecure protocols Zero-Day-Exploits Physical Layer Hardware trojans 33

34 We need an interdisciplinary large scale Effort User Anwendung Netzwerk Endgeräte L 4 Physical Layer 34

35 Energy Lab 2.0 a Security Testbed EnergyLab2.0 a Testbed Infrastructure Bild / KIT / Jülich / DLR Will become a testbed for sec

36 100%ige Sicherheit gibt es nicht Unsicherheit wird aber verstehbar und erforschbar. Sie liegt an den Grenzen des Modells (Seitenkanäle) Oder an falschen Annahmen Jede erkannte Unsicherheit führt nun zu einem Erkenntnisgewinn