4.4.2 (1) Finanzierung betriebsspezifischer vs. allgemeiner Qualifizierung Expected annual earnings Post-training level of output D A 1 X 3 B G 2 E C Marginal product in job B Marginal product in job A F 16 25 65 Age in years Direct outlays Costs Figure : Training within the firm If workers bear the full costs of training, they receive a wage equal to FG while training. In this manner they bear the opportunity costs indicated by the area DXA and the direct costs indicated by the area FGBA. The line AB represents their marginal product during training and the line BC their marginal product after training. If the workers bear the costs they will expect to enjoy some of the post-training returns indicated by the area BGEC. If firms bear the costs of training they will pay the worker a wage equal to their opportunity wage as indicated by line DE. They incur direct costs equal to the hatched area and indirect costs equal to the shaded area. They now expect to enjoy some of the post-training benefits indicated by the area BCEG. Just who bears the costs and enjoy the benefits turns on whether the training in question is general or specific. Quelle: Elliot, S. 168
4.4.2 (1a) Fall 1: allgemeines Training betriebliche Finanzierung der Ausbildungskosten Ausbildungsphase w Aus = DG nach Ausbildung w * >25J < BC Fall 2: betriebsspezifisches Training Finanzierung der Ausbildungskosten durch Arbeitnehmer Ausbildungsphase nach Ausbildung w Aus = FG w * >25J > GE Fall 3: betriebsspezifisches Training Finanzierung der Ausbildungskosten durch Betriebe Ausbildungsphase nach Ausbildung w Aus = DG w* >25J < BC FolieThPoArbeitsmarkt57.doc
4.4.2 (2) schulische Ausbildung postschulische Weiterbildung i.s. von general training mit individuellen Zeit- oder Opportunitätskosten angebotsorientierte Humankapitaltheorie postschulische Weiterbildung i.s. von specific training betrieblich finanzierte Weiterbildung betriebliches Beschäftigungsverhalten
4.4.2 (3) Results of estimation of models of the probability of being trained are shown in Table 3.12. The main findings are: Less-educated workers are significantly less likely to be trained in all countries considered except the Netherlands. This is important as most policies fail to affect the distribution of training across different categories of workers. Moreover, the labour market situation of less-skilled workers has deteriorated in many OECD countries [OECD (1997d)]. Large establishments are significantly more likely to train workers. Workers on temporary contracts and in part-time jobs are significantly less likely to be trained. This is an especially important finding given the trend towards the increasing number of these types of contracts in most OECD countries [ Chapter 1]. Public sector employees are significantly more likely to be trained. W1orkers in finance, insurance and business or community, social and personal services are more likely to be trained compared with other industries. Training probabilities decrease significantly with age in Germany and the Netherlands; but less so in other countries. Quelle: OECD 1999 FolieThPoArbeitsmart69.doc
4.4.3 (1) Für/Wider einer Berufsausbildungs-Abgabe in D (1) Skizzierung: Situation der dualen BA in D-W und D-O (2) Mögliche Maßnahmen? (2.1) BA-Abgabe für Nicht-Ausbilder-Betriebe und Umlage zugunsten von Ausbilder-Betrieben Alternativen: (2.2) Förderung der Mobilität von Jugendlichen (2.3) allg. Erhöhung der monetären Anreize der betrieblichen BA - Reduktion der betrieblichen Ausbildungskosten - Verbesserung der ex post-erträge - Verbesserung der allg. Beschäftigungsentwicklung (3) Einschätzung der Maßnahmen zu (2) FolieThPoArbeitsmarkt62.doc
4.4.3 (2) Warum finanzieren AG transferierbare (generelle) Trainingsmaßnahmen? zusätzliche Erträge durch betriebliches Training - außer Verbesserung der individuellen AP Kombination von generellem und spezifischem Training Informationsdefizite anderer Firmen bzgl. der ex post-werte des betrieblichen Trainings unterschiedliche Risikopräferenzen AG versus AN Rückzahlungsklausel FoliethPoArbeitsmarkt63.doc