Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 1984 / 2014

Transkript

1 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 1984 / 2014 Prof. Dr. Michael Waidner Technische Universität Darmstadt und Fraunhofer SIT TU Dresden, Fakultät für Informatik Dresden, 18. November 2014

2 1. Vorbemerkung 2. IT Sicherheit heute 3. Zusammenfassung 2

3 Vorbemerkung Wieso»1984 / 2014«? 1980er Jahre: Anfang der offenen Sicherheitsforschung in Deutschland, gemeinsamer Einstieg in das Thema für Andreas Pfitzmann & Michael Waidner Politik und Recht Volkszählung, PC + ISDN Angst vor Überwachung und Kontrolle Informationelle Selbstbestimmung Kryptodebatte Ende-zu-Ende Verschlüsselung Früher nur hypothetische Gefahren sind heute real, viele der Vorschläge von Andreas Pfitzmann aktueller denn je. Technik Moderne Kryptographie Anonymität & Pseudonymität im Netz Viren, Trojaner und Intrusion Detection Sicherheitszertifizierung 3

4 1. Vorbemerkung 2. IT Sicherheit heute 3. Zusammenfassung 4

5 2014:»Digital Space«is Everywhere Connected, programmable, open and shared. Generating massive amounts of data, often sensitive, mostly unstructured. Every new technology, service, consumption, business model creates new security and privacy challenges. 5

6 Society under Siege 1 Cybercrime, sabotage, espionage & individual surveillance 2 Mass surveillance 3 Loss of privacy No trust in ICT products and services 6

7 Society under Siege 1 Cybercrime, sabotage, espionage & individual surveillance 2 Mass surveillance 3 Loss of privacy No trust in ICT products and services 7

8 Impact of Cyber Insecurity (Germany) Cyber attacks considered serious threat by 74% of all enterprises (1), 85% of all users (2) 49% of all attacks are»opportunistic«(3) Many got already hit by cyber attacks 38% of all users (1), 21% with identity theft (2) ; 30% of all enterprises with cyber crime (1), 54% with industrial espionage, >50% through»hacking«(4) Significant damages 40 M /a in reported cases of computer fraud (reality likely 11x) (5) ; 40 B /a (1,6% BIP) total cost of cyber crime (6), larger than total costs of car incidents ) Sources: (1) BITKOM 3/5 2014, (2) SCHUFA 9/2013, (3) IBM 3/2013, (4) Corporate Trust 7/2014, (5) BKA 8/2014, (6) Center for Strategic and International Studies 6/2014, (7) Bundesanstalt für Straßenwesen 8/2010 8

9 Prototypical Attacks Targeted, organized, financially or politically motivated Zeus Trojan and Botnet (2007) Jérôme Kerviel vs. Société Générale (2008) Anonymous (2008) False Flag Operations: Iranian Cyber Army vs. Baidu Search Engine (2010) DigiNotar (2011), RSA/Lockheed-Martin (2011), Saudi Aramco (2012), EADS (2012),... Stuxnet (2010) PRC Unit 61398, Shanghai (2013) NSA / GCHQ Programs (2013/14) 9

10 Snowden Revelations on NSA/GCHQ Activities PRISM TAO TEMPORA BULLRUN MYSTIC MUSCULAR HACIENDA etc. Mass surveillance of Internet and mobile networks Wiretapping of selected individuals, including Chanceller Merkel Suspicion of support for industrial espionage Circular trading to evade national law Direct access auf cables satellites, Internet backbone, cloud providers in the USA/UK and likely also in EU/Germany Manipulation of central infrastructures (SSL PKIs, DNS, BGP) Manipulation of supply chain (»Tailored Access Operations«) Systematic backdoors in NIST standards, in specific products Collection of vulnerabilities in products 10

11 Why is Information Technology not Secure? 11

12 Why is Information Technology not Secure? Several fundamental problems Slow Adoption of Solutions Software Quality Problem Usability Problem Insider Problem 12

13 Slow Adoption of Security Best Practices in Industry Unbekannt Passwortschutz Risk assessment Strong authentication VPN / Network encryption Trennung ausl. Niederlassungen Verbot externe Datenträger Security monitoring ISO 27001, etc. Cyber insurance Sonstiges Organisation Encryption Other State-of-the-art security could stop 80% of currently successful attacks Most product vulnerabilities could be identified automatically Source: Studie Industriespionage 2014; Corporate Trust, 30. Juli 2014 (Grafiken 24, 27, 29) 13

14 Why is Information Technology not Secure? Several fundamental problems Slow Adoption of Solutions Usability Problem Insider Problem Software Quality Problem 14

15 Why is Information Technology not Secure? Constant number of new vulnerabilities Source: IBM X-Force 2013 Mid-Year Trend and Risk Report, September

16 Why is Information Technology not Secure? Complexity implies vulnerability Large software has vulnerabilities Well-known problems in majority of web apps Misconfiguration: 86% Integration problems: 79% 67% of all SW vendors without secure development process [Information Week 2012] Difficult (»impossible«) to identify intentionally introduced backdoors [IBM 2011] 16

17 / Bug Security Early-on Reduces Costs Error Correction (Patching) Intrusion/Botnet Detection Secure Design Intrusion Prevention Forensics Initial Development ~30 x Continued Development and Operations 1 x ~10 x Source: NIST

18 Strategy for Improving Security Security and Privacy by Design 100% Security We cannot get there Design for Intrusion Tolerance: Resilience, sustainability. Anticipate insecurity in all phases. Multiple layers of security. Resource oriented, fine grained. 0% We are here We may get there Investment Design for Security & Privacy: Design / test methods and tools. Secure blueprints & building blocks for actual problems. Maximum automation in design, test and operations. BMBF Cybersecurity Competence Center»European Center for Security and Privacy by Design«18

19 Society under Siege 1 Cybercrime, sabotage, espionage & individual surveillance 2 Mass surveillance 3 Loss of privacy No trust in ICT products and services 19

20 Snowden Revelations on NSA/GCHQ Activities PRISM TAO TEMPORA BULLRUN MYSTIC MUSCULAR HACIENDA etc. Mass surveillance of Internet and mobile networks Wiretapping of selected individuals, including Chanceller Merkel Suspicion of support for industrial espionage Circular trading to evade national law Direct access auf cables satellites, Internet backbone, cloud providers in the USA/UK and likely also in EU/Germany Manipulation of central infrastructures (SSL PKIs, DNS, BGP) Manipulation of supply chain (»Tailored Access Operations«) Systematic backdoors in NIST standards, in specific products Collection of vulnerabilities in products 20

21 Research Goals for Countering Mass Surveillance: Increase the confidentiality of communications through encryption Mechanisms of Choice Cryptography for encrypting data Anonymous communication for hiding metadata Challenges Secure cryptographic algorithms & protocols: Research ( ), Standards Secure Implementation: R&D Usability & Scalability: R&D Encrypting data end-to-end Communication: Volksverschlüsselung Storage Cloud: OmniCloud Compute Cloud: Secure MPC/FHE, etc. 21

22 Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology Identity, Privacy, Encryption Fraunhofer PKI, DLP Privacy Assessment, Privacy Advisor, Tracking Protection (Microsoft), Volksverschlüsselung Sender Ende-zu-Ende Verschlüsselung Empfänger Public Key Infrastructure Zertifizierung/Verteilung der öffentlichen Schlüssel 22

23 Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology Cloud Computing OmniCloud: Encryption CloudCycle, VeriMetrix 23

24 Society under Siege 1 Cybercrime, sabotage, espionage & individual surveillance 2 Mass surveillance 3 Loss of privacy No trust in ICT products and services 24

25 Commercial Data Collection and Exploitation (Examples) 25

26 Commercial Data Collection and Exploitation (Examples) 26

27 Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology Identity, Privacy, Encryption Fraunhofer PKI, DLP Privacy Assessment, Privacy Advisor, Tracking Protection (Microsoft), Volksverschlüsselung Quelle: Fraunhofer SIT, Okt. 2014, 27

28 What is at Risk? Informational Self-Determination: Loss of freedom For the individual: Being observed / sense of being observed For industry, government, society: Influence over public / individual opinion + loss of control over data collections Transparent citizen, transparent enterprise is ripe for discrimination High risk of centralized data silos Access to data silos by foreign services (e.g., NSA PRISM) Access by cyber criminals (e.g., distribution of malware via ads, using online social networks as prep for social engineering or as source of identifying easy victims) 28

29 Research Goals for Countering Loss of Privacy: Established technology concepts data minimization, anonymity & pseudonymity, transparency & control don t work well in»new«environments Cloud Computing? Classical Internet Social Internet Internet of Things??? Big Data??? Interdisziplinäres BMBF Projekt»Forum Privatheit Selbstbestimmtes Leben in der digitalen Welt«29

30 1. Vorbemerkung 2. IT Sicherheit heute 3. Zusammenfassung 30

31 Society under Siege 1 Cybercrime, sabotage, espionage & individual surveillance 2 Mass surveillance 3 Loss of privacy No trust in ICT products and services 31

32 Nachbemerkung Neue alte Probleme Andreas Pfitzmann war ein Visionär und Pionier der Forschung zu Datenschutz und Datensicherheit in Deutschland Mehrseitige Sicherheit Kryptographie & Steganographie Ende zu Ende Verschlüsselung Pseudonyme Transaktionen Benutzerkontrolliertes Identitätsmanagement Früher nur hypothetische Gefahren sind heute real, viele der Vorschläge von Andreas Pfitzmann aktueller denn je. Datenschutz-garantierende Fest- und Mobilnetze (Schutz von Meta-Daten) Transparenz und Kontrolle für den Datenschutz im Sozialen Internet 32

33 Prof. Dr. Michael Waidner Fraunhofer-Institut für Sichere Informationstechnologie SIT Institutsleiter Technische Universität Darmstadt Fachbereich Informatik, Professor CASED & EC SPRIDE, Direktor Rheinstraße 75, Darmstadt (Büro) (Mobil) 33