Characteristics of hidden dividend distributions

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1 22 chapter Ii HIDDEN DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS Luxembourg is of course under no obligation to apply the concept of hidden dividend distributions as defined by German case law. (1) The core of such case law, however, is widely accepted in Luxembourg tax literature, and should apply as it remains consistent with the spirit of the LITL (which is itself based on German income tax law). Moreover, the reasoning in Luxembourg case law dealing with hidden dividend distributions is in line with the above mentioned definition. (2) 2.2. Decrease (or averted increase) in the company s net equity In accordance with relevant case law, hidden dividend distributions require a decrease (or averted increase) in a company s net equity. (3) In other words, without the hidden dividend distribution, the company s net equity would be higher than it actually is (net equity test). The decrease (or averted increase) in the company s net equity should be determined on the basis of the company s tax balance sheet. (4) While a decrease in a company s net equity regularly relates to expenses (for example, excessive rental payments), an averted increase in a company s net equity is linked to lost profit (that is, where a company forgoes income that could be realized under market conditions). An averted increase in a company s net equity exists, for example, where a company disposes of an asset at a sales price below the fair market value or provides services for a remuneration that is below the market price. 1 - In particular, the application of more recent German jurisprudence requires a detailed examination of the facts and circumstances and the consistency of the decision with Luxembourg tax law and jurisprudence. 2 - Some examples of relevant Luxembourg case law include, Arrêt du Conseil d Etat du n 6690 (ID Legitax: 936), «Considérant que cette disposition de droit positif luxembourgeois, dont l origine remonte à des errements jurisprudentiels des cours et tribunaux fiscaux allemands, s explique par le souci du législateur de contrecarrer des manœuvres camouflant la véritable nature d une opération de distribution de bénéfices par le recours abusif à des techniques juridiques licites en droit privé.»; Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 397); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , N (ID Legitax: 675); Cour Administrative, Decision of , No C (ID Legitax: 9626); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , N 24105, (ID Legitax: 9414). 3 - See Guy Heintz, «L impôt sur le revenu des collectivités», Études Fiscales, Saint Paul, No. 113, 114, 115 (1999), p BFH, Decision of , I R 72/92, BStBl II 1993, p. 801; according to Article 40 (1) LITL, the tax treatment follows the accounting treatment unless a special tax provision or concept provides for a different treatment for Luxembourg tax purposes. However, within the net equity test tax adjustments relating to the hidden dividend distributions have no effect.

2 Characteristics of hidden dividend distributions 23 Example II-1: Decrease in the company s net equity A Luxembourg company ( LuxCo ) receives a EUR 2,000,000 loan from its Luxembourg parent company ( LuxParentCo ) bearing interest at a rate of 12%. The arm s length interest rate would amount to 7%. Thus, LuxCo is shifting an advantage of EUR 100,000 per annum (= EUR 2,000,000 * [12% - 7%]) to its shareholder, resulting in a decrease in its net equity. Loan (EUR 2m; interest rate > arm s length rate) LuxParentCo LuxCo Example II-2: Averted increase in the company s net equity LuxCo sells a car worth EUR 30,000 at its EUR 10,000 book value to its shareholder. The difference between the fair market value and the sales price (EUR 20,000) is an advantage shifted to the shareholder that results in an averted increase in the company s net equity (i.e. without the hidden dividend distribution, the net equity of LuxCo would be EUR 20,000 higher). Disposal of a car at a sales price below fair market value Shareholder LuxCo

3 24 chapter Ii HIDDEN DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS The company s net equity is not, however, reduced if the company has a corresponding receivable against the shareholder as a consequence of the transaction (provided the receivable has value). (1) Example II-3: Payment of expenses incurred by the shareholder LuxParentCo incurred EUR 70,000 expenses in relation to advisory services performed by an external service provider. Since LuxParentCo did not have sufficient cash to pay the invoice, it was agreed that LuxCo pay the liability and receive a refund within one month s time. In addition, LuxCo s receivable bears interest at arm s length. Receivable (EUR 70,000) LuxParentCo LuxCo Receivable (EUR 70,000) Service provider Payment (EUR 70,000) In the present case, the net equity of LuxCo is not affected by the transaction, as a receivable (EUR 70,000) is recorded in LuxCo s balance sheet. Hence, the payment of LuxParentCo s invoice should not be classified as a hidden dividend distribution. (2) The question arises as to whether advantages shifted by a company to its shareholder may be offset by corresponding advantages shifted from the shareholder to the company in a separate transaction (Vorteilsausgleich (3) ). Certain conditions need to be met for such intentional set-offs to be considered for Luxembourg tax purposes. In particular, in the absence of an economic connection between the two transactions, it is crucial that the intentional set-off be agreed beforehand between the parties. Moreover, there 1 - If the company records a receivable towards the shareholder, neither the net equity nor the taxable income of the company is affected; BFH, Decision of , I R 6/94, BStBl II 1997, p. 89; BFH, Decision of , I R 65/96, BStBl II 1998, p The receivable bears interest at arm s length. If the receivable were interest-free, an averted increase corresponding to the arm s length interest rate may be classified as a hidden dividend distribution. 3 - Intentional set-off.

4 Characteristics of hidden dividend distributions 25 should be a certain link between both transactions from a timing perspective. (1) Under the aforementioned conditions, a hidden dividend distribution should only be considered in as far as the advantage shifted by the company exceeds that received from the shareholder. Intentional set-offs may also be found within company groups for restating arm s length conditions in the transfer pricing between associated enterprises (so-called balancing payments ). Example II-4: Intentional set-off LuxCo rents out an apartment to its shareholder for rental payments of EUR 20,000 per annum (arm s length rental payments would be EUR 30,000 per year). The shareholder rents out a factory building to LuxCo for rental payments of EUR 110,000 per annum (arm s length rental payments would be EUR 120,000 per year). The shareholder and the company agree that the advantage shifted by the company to the shareholder compensates the reduced rental payments for the factory building. Letting of an apartment at a monthly rent below market prices Shareholder LuxCo Letting of a factory building at a monthly rent below market prices In the present example, the advantage shifted to the shareholder (EUR 10,000) should be offset by the advantage received by LuxCo (EUR 10,000). As a result, the company s net equity is unaffected and the advantage shifted by the company should not be classified as a hidden dividend distribution. 1 - BFH, Decision of I 62/61 U, BStBl III 1964, p. 370, Gewährt eine Kapitalgesellschaft zu Lasten des Gewinns ihren Gesellschaftern mit Rücksicht auf das Gesellschaftsverhältnis Vorteile, die sie einer gesellschaftsfremden Person nicht gewähren würde, so liegt eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung vor. Derartige Vorteile können durch Leistungen der Gesellschafter an die Kapitalgesellschaft nur aufgewogen werden, wenn die Beteiligten eindeutige Abmachungen getroffen haben, die die gewährten Vorteile als Gegenleistung für Leistungen der Gesellschafter an die Gesellschaft erkennbar machen, und wenn ein zeitlicher Zusammenhang besteht, der Leistung und Gegenleistung miteinander verbindet. ; BFH, Decision of , BStBl II 1977, p. 704; BFH, Decision of , BStBl II 1985, p. 18.

5 26 chapter Ii HIDDEN DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS 2.3. Motivation by the shareholding relationship Opening comments A decrease (or averted increase) in a company s net equity may only be considered a hidden dividend distribution to the extent it is motivated by the shareholding relationship (motivation test). Therefore, the advantage shifted by a company must be in the interest of its shareholder. In contrast, when a decrease (or averted increase) in a company s net equity is motivated by business reasons (that is, it is in the best commercial interest of the company), a hidden dividend distribution should not be considered Existence of a shareholding relationship A shareholding relationship between the beneficiary of an advantage (be it an individual or a company (1) ) and the company shifting the advantage is a necessary condition for a hidden dividend distribution to exist. It follows that in the absence of any shareholding relationship, no hidden dividend distribution should be considered. Whether the shareholder is resident in Luxembourg or not is irrelevant for the classification of an advantage as a hidden dividend distribution. (2) Additionally, there is no de minimis rule for an advantage to be classified as a hidden dividend distribution; (3) however, the shareholding percentage may constitute an important element in assessing the motivation test. (4) Hidden dividend distributions should only be considered in specific circumstances where advantages are shifted to future or former shareholders. Advantages granted to a future shareholder should in principle not fall within the scope of hidden dividend distributions unless there is a close temporal (and economic) connection to the acquisition of the participation in the company. (5) Advantages granted as an incentive for future shareholders to invest in the company should also not be classified as hidden dividend distributions. (6) 1 - The shareholder may also be a partnership. However, due to the transparency of partnerships for Luxembourg tax purposes, the hidden dividend distributions would be recognised at the level of the partners (the partnership may nonetheless be subject to municipal business tax thereon). 2 - BFH, Decision of , I R 70/70, BStBl II 1973, p. 449; BFH, Decision of , I R 183/75, BStBl II 1977, p The beneficiary may either be a minority or a majority shareholder; BFH, Decision of , IV R 135/82, BStBl II p. 635; Der Tatbestand der verdeckten Gewinnausschüttung ist nicht an eine bestimmte Mindestbeteiligung des Gesellschafters an der leistenden Gesellschaft geknüpft. 4 - The existence of a minority participation of, say 5%, in the company shifting an advantage should not automatically lead to a presumption that the advantage was motivated by the shareholding relationship since, in general, such shareholders have little or no control over the company. 5 - BFH, Decision of , VIII R 74/84, BStBl II 1989, p. 419, Eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung ist möglich, wenn die Leistung der Gesellschaft zwar vor Begründung des Gesellschaftsverhältnisses erbracht wird, ihren Grund aber in diesem Gesellschaftsverhältnis hat. Das gilt jedenfalls dann, wenn die Leistung in engem zeitlichen Zusammenhang mit der Begründung des Gesellschaftsverhältnisses steht und der Empfänger dann auch tatsächlich Gesellschafter wird. 6 - BFH, Decision of , I 83/65, BStBl II 1969, p. 14, Denn verdeckte Gewinnausschüttungen können nur Gesellschaftern zufließen, sei es unmittelbar, sei es mittelbar auf dem Weg über Zuwendungen an Personen, die den Gesellschaftern nahestehen (BFH- Urteil I 325/61 Svom 25. Oktober 1963, BFH 78, 46, BStBl III 1964, 17). Die Absicht der Steuerpflichtigen, die ausländischen Firmen als neue Gesellschafter an sich zu ziehen, reicht nicht aus, um verdeckte Gewinnausschüttungen an sie anzunehmen.

6 Characteristics of hidden dividend distributions 27 In contrast, advantages granted by a company to a former shareholder may be classified as hidden dividend distributions to the extent that the beneficiary was a shareholder at the time the underlying agreement was concluded. (1) Example II-5: Excessive pension payments A former shareholder of LuxCo receives a pension of EUR 6,000 per month in relation to services rendered in the past as director of LuxCo (the arm s length monthly pension would amount to EUR 4,000). At the time the former shareholder was a director and a shareholder of LuxCo, the latter accounted for pension payments through a provision for its future liability towards the (former) shareholder. (New) shareholder LuxCo Former shareholder Excessive pension payments In the present case, the advantage shifted by LuxCo to the former shareholder (EUR 2,000 per month) should be classified as a hidden dividend distribution at the level of the shareholder, since he was a shareholder of LuxCo at the conclusion of the pension agreement. Thus, the former shareholder should consider deemed dividend income of EUR 24,000 per annum. (2) 1 - BFH, Decision of , I R 114/70, BStBl II 1971, p. 600; BFH, Decision of , BStBl II 1978, p. 33; BFH, Decision of , VIII R 74/84, BStBl II 1989, p. 419, Entscheidend für eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung ist nach der Rechtsprechung des BFH, wie bereits ausgeführt, daß die Zuwendung der AG ihre Ursache im Gesellschaftsverhältnis hat. Das ist nicht nur dann möglich, wenn der Empfänger im Zeitpunkt, in dem die Gesellschaft leistet oder in dem ihm die Leistung zufließt, tatsächlich Gesellschafter ist. Der BFH hat, wie zuvor der RFH, eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung auch an einen ehemaligen Gesellschafter für möglich gehalten (BFH-Urteile vom 22. Juni 1977 I R 171/74, BFHE 123, 321, 326, BStBl II 1978, 33; vom 22. April 1971 I R 114/70, BFHE 102, 268, BStBl II 1971, 600; RFH-Urteil vom 12. November 1931 I A 495/30, RStBl 1932, 60). ; for example, excessive pensions paid to a former shareholder for previous employment by the company (e.g. as director) or advantages embedded in long-term contracts such as rental or loan agreements (i.e. where the remuneration to be paid by the former shareholder is below market prices). 2 - It is interesting to note that LuxCo should have considered hidden dividend distributions when recording the excessive part of the provision for future pension payments. In contrast, in the payment phase, the pensions should neither affect LuxCo s net equity nor its taxable income (to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis).

7 28 chapter Ii HIDDEN DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS Causation and the shareholding relationship Once the existence of a shareholding relationship between a company and the beneficiary of the advantage has been established, it is imperative to assess whether or not there is a causal link between the shareholding relationship and the decrease (or averted increase) in the company s net equity. In essence, if the company would not have agreed to the same terms and conditions with a third party, it is generally considered that the advantage is primarily motivated by the shareholding relationship rather than business considerations. (1) The analysis of the arm s length character of a transaction between a company and its shareholders is generally conducted with reference to the concept of the prudent business manager (ein ordentlicher und gewissenhafter Geschäftsleiter). Here, the terms and conditions of transactions entered into by a company and its shareholders are compared to those that a prudent business manager would have agreed to in regard to transactions with third parties (prudent business manager test). (2) The prudent business manager test is broadly similar to the arm s length test in a transfer pricing context. Accordingly, the arm s length character of a transaction may be analysed on the basis of internal comparables (that is, similar transactions between the company and third parties) or external comparables (that is, similar transactions between third parties). In certain cases, it may also be possible for the Luxembourg tax authorities to rely on the hypothetical behaviour of a prudent business manager. (3) 1 - BFH, , I 261/63, BStBl III 1967, p. 626; BFH, Decision of , I 228/65, BStBl II 1969, p. 243, Eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung setzt voraus, dass die Kapitalgesellschaft einem Gesellschafter einen Vermögensvorteil zuwendet, den sie bei Anwendung der Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters einem Nichtgesellschafter unter sonst gleichen Umständen nicht gewährt hätte. ; it has, however, been acknowledged that a business manager has a certain degree of discretion in regard to decision making, BFH, Decision of , I R 119/70, BStBl. II 1973, p. 322, Andererseits genügt bei einem Geschäft zwischen der Gesellschaft und dem Gesellschafter das Mißverhältnis zwischen Leistung und Gegenleistung für sich allein nicht, um eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung anzunehmen. Hinzukommen muß, daß ein ordentlicher und gewissenhafter Geschäftsleiter dieses Mißverhältnis erkannt und keinen rechtlichen oder betrieblichen Anlaß gesehen hätte, das Geschäft dennoch abzuschließen. Dabei darf nicht übersehen werden, daß einem Geschäftsleiter ein gewisser Spielraum kaufmännischen Ermessens einzuräumen ist. Sein Handeln muß freilich an den Gegebenheiten des Unternehmens ausgerichtet sein. 2 - Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 242); Cour Administrative, Decision of , No C (ID Legitax: 124); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 438); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 631); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 9184); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 676); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 675); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 2121); Cour Administrative, Decision of , No C and 13432C (ID Legitax: 7527); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 8198); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No ; Cour Administrative, Decision of , No C (ID Legitax: 9626); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 9414); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No (ID Legitax: 12164); Tribunal Administratif, Decision of , No and (ID Legitax: 14323); BFH, Decision of , I R 119/70, BStBl II 1973, p. 322; an incorrect decision by a business manager should not be classified as a hidden dividend distribution, BFH, Decision of , I R 123/97, BFH/NV 1999, p For example, in regard to transactions that may only occur between a company and its shareholders (here, no comparables are available). Besides, a prudent business manager would not enter into transactions that would, from the outset, lead to losses in the long-term. On this basis, the Luxembourg tax authorities may challenge the transfer pricing of Luxembourg companies that are not profitable; BFH, Decision of , I R 107/82, BStBl II 1987, p. 293, Dazu ist davon auszugehen, dass es die Aufgabe jeder Kapitalgesellschaft ist, als Erwerbsunternehmen Gewinne zu erzielen und die Gewinne nach Möglichkeit zu steigern.

8 Characteristics of hidden dividend distributions 29 The intention of a company to distribute profits or a party s consent to shift an advantage is irrelevant when considering hidden dividend distributions. Rather, the arm s length principle is the defining factor in assessing hidden dividend distributions. (1) In applying the arm s length test, the time of conclusion of the agreement (as opposed to the moment when agreement is exercised) is decisive. (2) Hence, all circumstances prevailing at the moment of concluding the agreement must be taken into account. (3) In contrast, developments following the conclusion of the agreement, such as a change in market prices, are irrelevant unless the company has the right to request that the contractual terms be adjusted (for example, in regard to long-term contracts). (4) 1 - BFH, Decision of , I R 107/69, BStBl II 1970, p. 229, Zu den Voraussetzungen einer verdeckten Gewinnausschüttung gehört weder die Absicht der Kapitalgesellschaft, den Gewinn verdeckt zu verteilen, noch die Einigung der Parteien darüber, daß die Zuwendung mit Rücksicht auf das Gesellschaftsverhältnis erfolgt. ; BFH, Decision of , I R 119/70, BStBl II 1973, p. 322; BFH, Decision of , BStBl II 1989, p BFH vom , I R 114/70, BStBl II 1971, p. 600, Leistungen einer Kapitalgesellschaft an einen Gesellschafter, die auf Grund eines Vertrages bewirkt werden, stellen verdeckte Gewinnausschüttungen dar, wenn und soweit die Gesellschaft bei Anwendung der Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters den Vertrag mit einem Nichtgesellschafter nicht geschlossen hätte. Diese Voraussetzung ist auf den Zeitpunkt des Vertragsschlusses, nicht auf den Zeitpunkt der späterliegenden Leistungen zu prüfen. ; BFH, Decision of , I R 166/73, BStBl II 1975, p. 617; BFH, Decision of , I R 36/93, BFH/NV 1994, p. 827; BFH, Decision of , I R 112/93, BStBl II 1995, p All circumstances that a prudent business manager would consider are relevant for analysing whether an advantage has been shifted. 4 - BFH, Decision of , I R 166/73, BStBl II 1975, p. 617, Die Voraussetzung, ob ein ordentlicher und gewissenhafter Geschäftsleiter den Vorteil auch einem Nichtgesellschafter gewährt hätte, kann vernünftigerweise nur auf den Zeitpunkt der Vornahme der verdeckten Gewinnausschüttung geprüft werden. Werden die Leistungen auf Grund eines Vertrages bewirkt, sind die Voraussetzungen auf den Zeitpunkt des Vertragsabschlusses, nicht auf den Zeitpunkt der später liegenden Leistungen zu prüfen (BFH-Urteil vom 22. April 1971 I R 114/70, BFHE 102, 268, BStBl II 1971, 600). Die spätere Entwicklung der Verhältnisse hat außer Betracht zu bleiben, es sei denn, die Gesellschaft habe von einer rechtlichen Möglichkeit, sich vom Vertrag loszusagen, was insbesondere bei Dauerschuldverhältnissen in Betracht kommt, keinen Gebrauch gemacht. ; BFH vom I R 25/82, BStBl. II 1989, p. 248.

9 30 chapter Ii HIDDEN DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS Example II-6: Arm s length test and timing aspects On 1 June 2011, LuxCo sells immovable property worth EUR 1,000,000 to its shareholder. In the purchase agreement the parties determine a sales price of EUR 1,000,000 that has to be paid upon transfer of the legal ownership on 1 September On 1 July 2011, the government announced that the district in which the immovable property is situated will be part of a development area. Shortly thereafter, the fair market value of the real estate increases to EUR 1,200,000. Disposal of immovable property Shareholder LuxCo Considering that the fair market value as of 1 June 2011 was agreed between the parties and that no information on the government s plan was then available, no averted increase in the company s net equity and, therefore, no hidden dividend distribution should be considered.

10 Characteristics of hidden dividend distributions 31 Example II-7: Arm s length test and timing aspects LuxCo has been renting out an apartment to its shareholder for 10 years. The monthly rental payments of EUR 1,000 reflect the market conditions prevailing at the time the rental agreement was concluded. According to the rental contract, on 1 January of each year, the landlord has the right to adjust rental payments to be in line with market conditions. LuxCo has not increased the monthly rent, although monthly rents paid for similar apartments amount to EUR 1,250. Letting of an apartment Shareholder LuxCo Since LuxCo did not renegotiate the monthly rent to reflect current market prices (though it was in a position to do so), LuxCo shifts an advantage to its shareholder that results in an averted increase in its net equity. A prudent business manager would not have granted the same advantage to a third party. Thus, the advantage is considered to be motivated by the shareholding relationship Related party of the shareholder The scope of hidden dividend distributions extends to advantages shifted by a company to a related party of the shareholder (so-called triangular cases ). Here, a rebuttable presumption that the advantage was motivated by the shareholding relationship is made, which is derived from the relationship between the shareholder and the related party thereof. However, where it can be evidenced that the company was acting in its best interest, no hidden dividend distribution should be considered. (1) 1 - The fact that the recipient of the advantage is a related party of the shareholder does not per se trigger the classification of an advantage as a hidden dividend distribution; BFH, Decision of , I 325/61 S, BStBl III 1964, p. 17, Zuwendungen einer Kapitalgesellschaft an Nichtgesellschafter können grundsätzlich nur dann eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung darstellen, wenn die Empfänger Personen sind, die den Gesellschaftern oder einem der Gesellschafter nahestehen. Daß es sich um Personen handelt, die der Gesellschaft nahestehen, reicht für die Annahme einer verdeckten Gewinnausschüttung nicht aus. ; BFH, Decision of , I R 9/85, BStBl II 1989, p. 631; BFH, Decision of , I R 139/94, BStBl II 1997, p. 301.

11 32 chapter Ii HIDDEN DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS The relationship between the shareholder and the related party can be of any nature (familial (1), corporate (2), contractual (3) etc.); a common interest should however not suffice. (4) Related parties of the shareholder may be individuals or companies. (5) In order to meet the motivation test, an advantage shifted to a related party of the shareholder must be in the interest of the shareholder. This is because an advantage shifted to a third party cannot be classified as a hidden dividend distribution. However, whether or not the advantage directly benefits the shareholder should be irrelevant. (6) Where an advantage shifted by the company to a related party of the shareholder (for example, a family relative) is classified as a hidden dividend distribution, the advantage granted to the related party of the shareholder is, for Luxembourg tax purposes, deemed to be: (i) first granted by the company to the shareholder (hidden dividend distribution) (ii) that subsequently shifts the advantage to the related party. (7) 1 - BFH, Decision of , I R 192/82, BStBl II 1987, p. 797; BFH, Decision of , I R 103/86, BStBl II 1988, p BFH, Decision of , I 82/64, BStBl III 1967, p. 791; BFH, Decision of , I 98/65, BStBl II 1968, p. 322; BFH, Decision of , BStBl II 1986, p. 178; BFH, Decision of , I R 150/82, BStBl II 1987, p BFH, Decision of , I 325/61 S, BStBl III 1964, p BFH, Decision of , I R 247/81, BStBl II 1986, p. 195, Zum Kreis der dem Gesellschafter nahestehenden Personen können auch juristische Personen gehören (BFHE 91, 239, BStBl II 1968, 322). Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Gesellschafter und dem Dritten, die die Annahme einer mittelbaren Zuwendung an den Gesellschafter rechtfertigen, können schuldrechtlicher, tatsächlicher oder gesellschaftsrechtlicher Art sein. ; BFH, Decision of , I R 139/94, BStBl II 1997, p. 301, Zur Begründung des Nahestehens reicht jede Beziehung eines Gesellschafters der Kapitalgesellschaft zu einer anderen Person aus, die den Schluß zuläßt, sie habe die Vorteilszuwendung der Kapitalgesellschaft an die andere Person beeinflußt. Derartige Beziehungen können familienrechtlicher, gesellschaftsrechtlicher, schuldrechtlicher oder auch rein tatsächlicher Art sein. ; even a friendship between the shareholder and the beneficiary may be sufficient. 5 - BFH, Decision of , I 325/61 S, BStBl III 1964, p. 17; BFH, Decision of , I R 28/69, BStBl II 1972, p. 320, Eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung kann auch dann in Betracht kommen, wenn der Vermögensvorteil nicht unmittelbar dem Gesellschafter, sondern einer ihm nahestehenden Person zugewandt wird. Voraussetzung ist aber, daß die unmittelbare Zuwendung an die nahestehende Person einen Vorteil für den Gesellschafter selbst zur Folge hat. ; BFH, Decision of , I R 238/72, BStBl II 1975, p. 48; BFH, Decision of , IV R 135/72, BStBl II 1975, p An advantage shifted to a related party may be in the interest of the shareholder if (i) a liability of the shareholder is satisfied, (ii) a voluntary benefit is granted by the shareholder to the related party or (iii) the advantage shifted to the related party otherwise benefits the shareholder; BFH, Decision of , I 228/65, BStBl II 1969, p. 243, Der Vermögensvorteil muss einem Gesellschafter zufließen, sei es unmittelbar von der Kapitalgesellschaft, sei es mittelbar über eine ihm dem Gesellschafter nahestehenden Person. Eine mittelbare Zuwendung des Vorteils ist vor allem anzunehmen, wenn der Vorteil, den die Kapitalgesellschaft einem Nichtgesellschafter gewährt, wirtschaftlich auch dem Gesellschafter zufließt. ; BFH, Decision of , I R 86/75, BStBl II 1977, p. 569; BFH, Decision of , I R 284/82, BFH/NV 1989, p. 395; BFH, Decision of , I R 139/94, BStBl II 1997, p. 301, Eine verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung i.s. des KSTG 8 Abs. 3 Satz 2 KStG in Form der Zuwendung eines Vermögensvorteils an eine einem Gesellschafter der Kapitalgesellschaft nahestehende Person setzt nicht voraus, daß die Zuwendung einen Vorteil für den Gesellschafter selbst zur Folge hat. 7 - The deemed advantage to the shareholder is not to be considered as a fiction; rather, it follows the economic reality of the transaction; BFH, Decision of , I 82/64, BStBl III 1967, p. 791; BFH, Decision of , I R 51/66, BStBl II 1971, p. 408.