Secure Clouds Requirements for Service Providers Prof. Dr. Hannes P. Lubich, FHNW

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1 Secure Clouds Requirements for Service Providers 1

2 Disclaimer 1: «Clouds» are Difficult to Assess 2

3 Disclaimer 2: Security is Never a Favourable Topic Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing. Helen Keller 3

4 But Still: Security is a No. 1 Concern 4

5 Clouds A Reminder Cloud_computing.svg.png 5

6 Cloud Utilization Models 6

7 Providers: Oracle Amazon Google Microsoft Salesforce Deutsche Telekom Hewlett-Packard T-Systems Fujitsu Techn. Solutions IBM company-internal Clouds many new providers Cloud Providers and Location Criteria Location Selection: stabile environment (economical, geographical, political, ) Reliable supply (power, cooling, access, personnel) Good connectivity Customer access Legal environment 7

8 Cloud Locations Apple DC, Santa Clare Valley Google DC, Dalles, OR Facebook DC, Lulea, Schweden (am Polarkreis) IBM DC, Syracuse Univ., NY 8

9 But also «Stealth» DC Minnetonka, Minnesota Tata DCs in India Realty Trust DC, Singapur 9

10 Cloud Usage Patterns Private Use: services File sharing services Music, video exchange Document storage Backup, Archiving large population, smaller amounts of data per person standardised flat rate offerings SME Use: services Backup, Archiving Document storage small user group, offerings still hardly known / used In the future private cloud per sector Enterprise and Public Sector Use: Private cloud services Search- / filter services (spam / content filter, data mining, etc.) Application services (CRM, accounting, ordering, e-shops) large volumes, small number of clients Cooperative model supplier / client 10

11 Pro s and Con s of Cloud Usage Potential Pro s Potential Con s Economy of scale Flexibilisation of cost Transfer of risks Complexity reduction Concentration on core competencies Dependency chains Intransparency Transition cost Legal insecurity Monolithic culture Risk / security concerns 11

12 But Sometimes, Things Will Go Wrong Apple kann verschlüsselte icloud-daten einsehen "Sie erklären sich damit einverstanden, dass Apple, ohne Ihnen gegenüber zu haften, auf Ihre Kontoinformationen und Ihre Inhalte zugreifen, diese nutzen, aufbewahren und/oder an Strafverfolgungsbehörden, andere Behörden und / oder sonstige Dritte weitergeben darf, wenn Apple der Meinung ist, dass dies vernünftigerweise erforderlich oder angemessen ist, wenn dies gesetzlich vorgeschrieben ist oder wenn Apple einen hinreichenden Grund zu der Annahme hat, dass ein solcher Zugriff, eine solche Nutzung, Offenlegung oder Aufbewahrung angemessenerweise notwendig ist,...". Spiegel Online, Spiegel Online, August 2011 Amazon EC2 vom Netz Im August 2011 führte ein Blitzeinschlag zum Stromausfall des Rechenzentrums in Dublin, in dem die Amazon EC2- Infrastruktur gehostet wird. Der Blitz schlug dabei in einen Transformator ein, wodurch selbst die Rechenzentrumseigenen Generatoren nicht gestartet werden konnten. Somit ging das Rechenzentrum kurzzeitig vom Netz. Amazon sprach von zwei Stunden Ausfallzeit. Bei einigen der beeinträchtigten Instanzen dauerte die Wiederherstellung jedoch länger. 12

13 Typical Concerns of Potential Cloud Users I No control over location of service provision (incl. transit locations and networks) and their respective security measures (from physical protection and access control to operative security concepts, certifications etc.). Traditional «due diligence» by customers will be hard to do. Conflicts between trans-border functionality and national legislation: e.g. how can customers assess whether a service moving through the cloud is obeying local data protection and privacy laws. Common use, large-scale clouds will only have «average» security mechanisms in place. There will be substantial additional cost for additional security measures, if they can be integrated into the Cloud provider s service model at all. 13

14 Typical Concerns of Potential Cloud Users II Monitoring the status of security and risks by customers becomes difficult: Reporting interfaces must be tailored to customer needs and ways of operating, thus the Cloud service must provide such data and functionality per customer. Availability / dependency chains become longer, and harder to define: Virtualization, location-independence etc. mean intransparency for customers. This must be accounted for in corresponding crisis management and business continuity scenarios. Large, commercial Cloud services become primary targets for attacks: Motivations range from blackmailing the service provider to denial of service, data / identity theft and economical, governmental or military intelligence gathering, based on access to a large number of technically identical targets in the cloud. 14

15 How to Judge the Security of a Cloud Data Center 1. Is there a documented information security concept and how do you deal with additional, customer-specific security requirements? 2. How to you physically / logically separate customers in your data center(s)? 3. Is hardware of other means of IT operation moved or shared between customer environments? 4. How can customers evaluate whether compliance with all relevant security policies is enforced and audited regularly? 5. Is data encryption and strong authentication part of the provider offering, or does this have to be implemented by each customer? 6. How do you deal with highly privileged administration access is there a stringent rolebased access control model and enforcement? 7. Can the provider ensure that deleted data is also deleted on all operational backups, archives, off-site storage devices etc.? 8. Can the provider ensure that all data, access profiles etc. are fully deleted when a customer chooses to discontinue service use? 9. What is the data handover/deletion procedure when the provider defaults (e.g. Nirvanix)? 10. How do you deal with spontaneous peaks load in your ICT environment? Does the load model and the security model apply to all geographically distributed locations? 11. Are there any provisions to differentiate peak load from denial of service attacks? 15

16 Cloud Security Relevant Documents «Cloud Security Alliance» «Open Data Center Alliance» guidance/csaguide.v3.0.pdf 16

17 Clouds Risk- Management Governance / Management Governance & Enterprise Risk Management Legal Issues, Contracts and Electronic Discovery Compliance and Audit Management Information Management and Data Security Interoperability and Portability Opeation Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Data Center Operations Incident Response, Notification and Remediation Application Security Encryption and Key Management Identity, Entitlement, and Access Management Virtualization Security as a Service Source: Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V3.0, Cloud Security Alliance 17

18 Private / Hybrid Clouds as a Possible Intermediate Step A company-specific (and potentially internally operated) cloud: Exploratory Cloud: «Trial» for Cloud services Departmental Cloud: departmental Cloud service Enterprise Cloud: enterprise-wide Cloud service, tailored to particular client needs Problem: «economy of scale» vs. security 18

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20 Summary 20

21 Thank You Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz Hochschule für Technik Institut für Mobile und Verteilte Systeme Prof. Dr. Hannes P. Lubich Dozent für ICT System Management Bahnhofstrasse 6, CH-5210 Windisch T: (direct) 21