Shareholder rights and governance efficiency

Transkript

1 Shareholder rights and governance efficiency Europäische Aktionspläne und Reform der Aktionärsrechte Piani di azioni europei e riforma dei diritti degli azionisti Universität Innsbruck Institut für Italienisches Recht/Istituto di Diritto Italiano Innsbruck 28 V 2015 Prof. Francesco A. Schurr 1

2 1. Definizione/1 1. Definition/1 Shareholder activism Shareholder activism Intervento di un azionista esterno al gruppo di controllo dell impresa Tätigwerden eines Aktionärs der nicht zur kontrollierenden Gruppe des Unternehmens gehört Obiettivo di modificare le politiche e strategie aziendali adottate dal management Ziel: Veränderung der Politik und Strategie des Unternehmens, die vom Management verfolgt werden Tipicamente senza intenzione di takeover Typischerweise keine takeover- Absicht 2

3 1. Definizione/2 1. Definition/2 Come si può esercitare lo shareholder activism? Wie kann der shareholder activism ausgeübt werden? Domande nelle assemblee degli azionisti Stellen von Fragen in der Aktionärsversammlung Proposte da votare in assemblea Vorschläge zur Abstimmung in der Versammlung Dialogo con il management (a porte chiuse) Dialog mit dem Management (vor verschlossener Tür) Coinvolgimento dei giornalisti Einbindung der Journalisten 3

4 2. Sviluppi in Italia/1 2. Entwicklungen in Italien/1 Decreto legge 24 giugno 2014 n. 91 (il «Decreto Competitività 2014»), entrato in vigore il 25 giugno 2014 Decreto legge vom 24 Juni 2014 Nr. 91 («Decreto Competitività 2014»), in Kraft seit 25. Juni 2014 L'art. 20, comma 1, del «Decreto Competitività 2014» modificazione del d.lgs. 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 («TUF») Art. 20 Abs. 1 des «Decreto Competitività 2014» Abänderung des d.lgs. vom 24. Februar 1998, Nr. 58 («TUF») Introduzione dell'art. 127-quinquies («maggiorazione del voto») Einführung des 127-quinquies («maggiorazione del voto») 4

5 2. Sviluppi in Italia/2 2. Entwicklungen in Italien/2 Introduzione dell'art. 127-quinquies («maggiorazione del voto») Einführung des 127-quinquies («Zuschlag auf die Stimme») Gli statuti possono disporre che sia attribuito voto maggiorato, fino a un massimo di due voti Die Statuten können ein Mehrfachstimmrecht (Zuschlag) vorsehen, bis zu zwei Stimmen pro Aktie Per ciascuna azione appartenuta al medesimo soggetto per un periodo continuativo non inferiore a ventiquattro mesi (a decorrere dalla data di iscrizione nell'elenco speciale) Dieselbe Person muss für für mindestens vierundzwanzig Monate (ab der Eintragung in ein besonderes Verzeichnis) Inhaberin der Aktie gewesen sein 5

6 2. Sviluppi in Italia/3 2. Entwicklungen in Italien/3 Ratio legis?/1 Ratio legis?/1 Maggiore partecipazione alla corporate governance da parte di coloro che si impegnano a rimanere soci per un periodo di tempo sufficientemente lungo Wer für einen längeren Zeitraum Gesellschafter bleibt, soll eine stärkere Rolle bei der corporate governance spielen Riduzione del potere dei «speculatori» Verminderung der Macht der «Spekulanten» 6

7 2. Sviluppi in Italia/5 2. Entwicklungen in Italien/5 Ratio legis?/2 Ratio legis?/2 Facilitare l'accesso alla quotazione delle imprese familiari Erleichterung des Zugangs zur Börsennotierung für Familienunternehmen Il gruppo di controllo può in questo modo mantenere la posizione di azionista di riferimento Damit kann eine Rolle als kontrollierender Gesellschafter erhalten bleiben 7

8 3. Sviluppi in Europa/1 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/1 «Piani di azione europei» «Europäische Aktionspläne» Misure volte a migliorare il governo societario delle circa diecimila società quotate nelle borse europee Maßnahmenpaket zur Verbesserung der Unternehmensführung von etwa zehntausend börsennotierten Unternehmen in Europa Ratio: competitività e sostenibilità a lungo termine Ratio: Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und langfristige Tragfähigkeit 8

9 3. Sviluppi in Europa/2 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/2 Visione politica e economica Politische und wirtschaftliche Vision Una visione concentrata sul breve termine potrebbe danneggiare le imprese europee e l'economia Kurzfristiges Denken könnte europäischen Unternehmen und der Wirtschaft schaden Necessità di una buona corporate governance a invertire questa tendenza Notwendigkeit einer soliden corporate governance zur Änderung der Entwicklung 9

10 3. Sviluppi in Europa/3 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/3 Azionisti devono impegnarsi maggiormente nelle società Aktionöre müssen sich verstärkt in die Gesellschaft einzubringen Azionisti devono adottare una prospettiva di più lungo periodo Aktionäre müssen eine langfristigere Perspektive mitbringen Azionisti devono poter esercitare un controllo adeguato sul management Aktionäre müssen eine angemessene Kontrolle über das management ausüben Azionisti devono avere la possibilità di esprimere un voto vincolante sulle remunerazioni Aktionäre müssen die Möglichkeit haben, über die Festsetzung von Vergütungen zu bestimmen 10

11 3. Sviluppi in Europa/4 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/4 Revisione dell'attuale della «direttiva sui diritti degli azionisti» (direttiva 2007/36/CE) Vorschlag zur Überarbeitung der geltenden «Aktionärsrechterichtlinie» (Richtlinie 2007/36/EG) Rimedio alle lacune in materia di governo societario delle imprese quotate Behebung von Mängeln bei der Führung börsennotierter Unternehmen Modificazione del ruolo degli azionisti (investitori istituzionali e gestori di attivi) Änderung der Rolle der Aktionäre (institutionelle Anleger und Vermögensverwalter) 11

12 3. Sviluppi in Europa/5 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/5 Modificazione dello status giuridico degli intermediari e dei consulenti in materia di voto, imprese che prestano servizi agli azionisti Änderung der Rechtsstellung der Finanzintermediäre und Berater für die Stimmrechtsvertretung, also Firmen, die Dienstleistungen für Aktionäre anbieten Reazione alla crisi economica Reaktion auf Wirtschaftskrise Gli azionisti hanno appoggiato l'eccessiva assunzione di rischi a breve termine da parte del management? Aktionäre haben vor der Krise übermäßige kurzfristige Risiken seitens des Managements unterstützt? Gli azionisti non hanno esercitato un attento controllo sulle società? Aktionäre haben Unternehmen nicht sorgfältig genug überwacht? 12

13 3. Sviluppi in Europa/6 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/6 Status quo nella revisione della direttiva 2007/36/CE Status quo bei der Überarbeitung der Richtlinie 2007/36/EG Da poco la direttiva è «arrivata» al parlamento Europeo (Committee on legal affairs) Seit Kurzem ist die Richtlinie beim Europäischen Parlament «angekommen» (Committee on legal affairs) Critica: shareholder vs stakeholder? Kritik: shareholder vs stakeholder? 13

14 3. Sviluppi in Europa/7 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/7 Commissione: maggiore coinvolgimento degli azionisti è l unico elemento utilizzabile per miglioramento della corporate governance? Kommission: die stärkere Einbindung der Aktionäre ist das einzige Element für die Verbesserung der corporate governance Parlamento: Bisogna coinvolgere invece gli stakeholders, in particolare i lavoratori? Parlament: Muss man verstärkt die stakeholders einbinden, im Besonderen die Arbeitnehmer? 14

15 3. Sviluppi in Europa/8 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/8 Say on pay: principi Say on pay: Prinzipien Introduzione del diritto di voto degli azionisti sulle retribuzioni Mitspracherecht bei der Festsetzung von Vergütungen Al momento scarsa correlazione tra le remunerazioni e i risultati di gestione? Sind Gehälter in den Chefetagen der Unternehmen nur unzureichend an die Leistung gekoppelt? Incoraggiamento di una dannosa tendenza alla programmazione a breve termine? Förderung kurzfristiger Entwicklungen? 15

16 3. Sviluppi in Europa/9 3. Entwicklungen in Europa/9 Say on pay: trasparenza Say on pay: Transparenz Le società saranno tenute a pubblicare informazioni trasparenti, comparabili ed esaurienti sulle loro politiche retributive Unternehmen werden verpflichtet sein, klare, vergleichbare und umfassende Informationen über ihre Vergütungspolitik offenzulegen Comunque nessun vincolo in relazione all'importo massimo delle retribuzioni sul piano dell UE Keine verbindliche Deckelung der Vergütung auf EU-Ebene 16

17 4. Conclusioni 4. Ergebnis Incertezza politica riguardante la revisione della direttiva 2007/36/CE Politische Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Überarbeitung der Richtlinie 2007/36/EG Coinvolgimento precoce del parlamento Europeo Unüblicherweise Europ. Parlament sehr früh in Entscheidungsprozess eingebunden Dibattito sul conflitto tra interessi degli shareholder e stakeholder rischia di perdere l obiettivo, cioè quello di affrontare il fenomeno dello shareholder activism Die Diskussion über den Konflikt der Interessen der shareholder und stakeholder birgt die Gefahr in sich, dass das Ziel der Regelung des shareholder activism verfehlt wird 17

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19 GUARDANDOSI ATTORNO (I) Una scelta non molto «europea». I Paesi con cui ci confrontiamo non lo conoscono e spesso lo vietano esplicitamente 12 AktG tedesco 12 AktG austriaco art. 188 LSC spagnola

20 GUARANDOSI ATTORNO (II) La versione francese delle loyalty shares: art. L CComm I paesi nordici e il Regno Unito sono più flessibili Art e Burgerlijk Wetboek. (Olanda) Kap. 4, 5 Aktiebolagslag 2005:551 (Svezia) 46 Selskabsloven (Danimarca) Luku 3, 3 Osakeyhtiölaki (Finlandia) Sec. 284 Companies Act (UK)

21 LE TENDENZE COMUNITARIE L Action plan 2003 e lo studio sul principio di proporzionalità (2007) Il Libro verde sul finanziamento a lungo termine dell economia europea (2013) Il contesto: Attivismo degli investitori, ampliamento degli investimenti, efficienza organizzativa e finanziaria

22 UN PO DI MATEMATICA Le conseguenze sul principio di equilibrio tra proprietà e controllo: il dimezzamento della partecipazione minima per governare una società. Un po di matematica. Dal 25%+1 al 12,5%+1. (50% azioni senza voto + 12,5 % azioni a voto triplo + 37,5 % azioni ordinarie)

23 IL PERCHE DI UNA RIFORMA Fiat, Olanda, l operazione di fusione per incorporazione Una reazione tardiva

24 LA SOSTANZA E LA FORMA Pluralità di diritti o diritto più pesante? Il problema (solo teorico?) del voto divergente. Costituzione in usufrutto o pegno e ripartizione del voto?

25 IL CONTENUTO DEL DIRITTO DI VP Profili quantitativi: numeri interi e frazioni. Due o tre voti per azioni Un voto frazionario per azione Voto premiale per pacchetto di azioni (2 azioni 3 voti)? Sarebbe un elemento di personalizzazione dei diritti Qualche problema nel computo dei quorum

26 VOTO PLURIMO SELETTIVO Selezione per materia: piena libertà dello statuto L assoggettamento a condizione La condizione binaria (verificate o non verificate per tutti) E le condizioni soggettive? Il diritto all azione e il diritto al socio Voto plurimo e voto maggiorato Voto plurimo condizionato per tutti i soci (potenzialmente)? I problemi nel calcolo dei quorum: necessità di un data-base preventivo

27 LE RICADUTE SUI QUORUM: DATI Il silenzio degli artt L art. 127-quinquies, co. 8, tuf: «Se lo statuto non dispone diversamente, la maggiorazione del diritto di voto si computa anche per la determinazione dei quorum costitutivi e deliberativi che fanno riferimento ad aliquote del capitale sociale. La maggiorazione non ha effetto sui diritti, diversi dal voto, spettanti in forza del possesso di determinate aliquote di capitale»

28 E LORO LETTURA L interpretazione della norma: quorum calcolati sul capitale presente e quorum calcolati sul capitale globale («si computa anche») L applicazione analogica della norma sul voto maggiorato L autonomia statutaria: la diversa disposizione dello statuto Computo sul numero di azioni, per i quorum basati sul capitale globale: SI Richiesta presenza o voto anche di una certa frazione del capitale globale: SI Computo sul numero di azioni, per i quorum basati sul capitale presente: NO Richiesto voto anche di una certa frazione del capitale presente: SI E l art. 2369, co. 4?

29 IL VP NELLE SOCIETA QUOTATE La permanenza in vita delle azioni già emesse L emissione di nuove azioni a VP nei casi previsti L aumento a pagamento e i limiti all emissione La proporzionalità numerica (il fine codificato e la regola deducibile) L identità di contenuto (no azioni a VP inferiore: o tutto o niente)

30 IL VOTO MAGGIORATO NELLE SOCIETA QUOTATE Diritti delle azioni e diritti dei soci: la rivoluzione copernicana Voto maggiorato vs. voto plurimo: lo strano caso dei limiti all autonomia statutaria Voto maggiorato per tutti e privilegio ad una categoria

31 I PRESUPPOSTI DEL VM L appartenenza dell azione: centralità del registro e dunque del dato formale Costituzione in usufrutto o pegno dell azione e sorte della maggiorazione L aumento di capitale gratuito e l estensione automatica: anche al socio che aveva rinunciato? L aumento di capitale e la regola dell acquisto proporzionale Sulle azioni optate, in proporzione a quelle per cui si gode del privilegio Non sulle azioni acquisite in più rispetto alle optate Non se il socio aveva rinunciato al privilegio Il privilegio non segue l opzione, se questa è ceduta

32 IL CONTENUTO DEL PRIVILEGIO Voto doppio o voto frazionario? Voto frazionario crescente per anzianità? Un più articolato assortimento? Privilegio su particolari materie? Privilegio subordinato a (altre) condizioni?

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35 Prof. Dr. Peter Kindler Innsbruck, Der aktuelle Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zur Änderung der Aktionärsrechte- Richtlinie - Bemerkungen aus deutscher Sicht Gliederung A. Die Umsetzung der Aktionärsrechterichtlinie in deutsches Recht I. Grundlagen II. Einberufung der Hauptversammlung III. Aktionärsrechte (Teilnahme an der HV) B. Der geplante Ausbau der Aktionärsrechte I. Der Vorschlag zur Änderung der EU-Aktionärsrechterichtlinie im Überblick II. Vorstandsvergütung 1. Abstimmung über die Vergütungspolitik (say on pay) a) Bindungswirkung b) Inhalt der Vergütungspolitik 2. Nachträglicher Vergütungsbericht (Art. 9b RL-E) a) Pflichtinhalt des Vergütungsberichts b) Standardisierung c) Aktionärsbeschluss 3. Kritik a) Vergütungspolitik und Anstellungsvertrag b) Vergleich zum gescheiterten Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Kontrolle der Vorstandsvergütung (VorStKOG) III. Geschäfte mit nahestehenden Unternehmen und Personen (related party transactions) 1. Der geplante Neuregelung im Überblick 2. Einzelfragen 1

36 a) Nahestehende Unternehmen und Personen b) Transaktionen und Bereichsausnahmen c) Wesentlichkeitsschwelle d) Sanktionen 3. Kritik a) Offenlegung b) Vertragskonzern quo vadis? c) Bezugsrechtsausschluss zu Gunsten einer nahestehenden Person d) Unabhängige Prüfung durch den Aufsichtsrat C. Fazit Die Umsetzung der Aktionärsrechterichtlinie in das deutsche Recht erscheint weitgehend gelungen. Bei der Klärung von Zweifelsfragen hinsichtlich der Reichweite des Auskunftsrechts des Aktionärs hat der Bundesgerichtshof in dem Verfahren aus dem Komplex Kirch/Deutsche Bank zu Recht kein Vorabentscheidungsverfahren vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof eingeleitet. Die geplante Ergänzung der RL konnte hier nur hinsichtlich der Vorstandsvergütung und der Geschäfte mit nahestehenden Personen behandelt werden. Hinsichtlich der Vorstandsvergütung ist die Stärkung der Aktionärsrechte grundsätzlich zu begrüßen. Für das deutsche Recht bedeutet außerdem die Verstärkung der Transaktionspublizität bei Geschäften mit nahestehenden Personen einen signifikanten Fortschritt, ebenso die Erstreckung auf den Bezugsrechtsausschluss bei der Kapitalerhöhung. Anpassungsbedarf besteht im Hinblick auf den verzögerten Nachteilsausgleich gem. 311 AktG. Die international wenig bekannte Konstellation des Vertragskonzerns wird auch vom neuen Kommissionsvorschlag nicht berücksichtigt. Hierfür sollte im weiteren Gesetzgebungsprozess eine Ausnahmeregelung herbeigeführt werden. Andernfalls macht ein Beherrschungsvertrag nur noch mit einer nicht börsennotierten Tochtergesellschaft Sinn. Auch die Stärkung der Überwachungsaufgabe des Aufsichtsrats im Sinne einer vorherigen statt wie bislang nur einer nachträglichen Prüfung von Geschäften mit nahestehenden Personen verbessert die Missbrauchsbekämpfung auf diesem Gebiet. Die Vorabprüfung liegt im Trend einer guten Unternehmensführung und stärkt deren Effizienz. Bei den Transaktionen mit nahestehenden Personen ist die wichtigste Neuerung aus deutscher Sicht die Zulässigkeit der Verlagerung von Prüfung und Zustimmungserteilung auf den Aufsichtsrat. Zudem können die Mitgliedstaaten gewisse quantitative Schwellenwerte festlegen und Bereichsausnahmen zulassen, wobei Gründe der Rechtssicherheit für die Normierung starrer Grenzen sprechen. 2

37 Prof. Dr. Peter Kindler Innsbruck, Der aktuelle Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zur Änderung der Aktionärsrechte- Richtlinie - Bemerkungen aus deutscher Sicht Normtext Kompromissvorschlag der lettischen Ratspräsidentschaft vom zur Reform der Aktionärsrechterichtlinie 2007/36/EG (Auszug, durch Verf. konsolidierte Fassung): Interinstitutional File: 2014/0121 (COD) No. prev. doc.: 13758/14 DRS 119 CODEC 1923 Subject: Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of longterm shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement Presidency compromise text Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1. Amendments to Directive 2007/36/EC (4) The following articles 9a, 9b and 9c are inserted: Article 9a. Right to vote on the remuneration policy 1. Member States shall ensure that companies establish a remuneration policy as regards directors. Companies shall only pay remuneration to their directors in accordance with that remuneration policy. However, Member States may allow companies in exceptional circumstances of proved or potential financial difficulty to pay remuneration to individual directors outside the general remuneration policy where the remuneration package of that individual director has been subject to a shareholder vote. Member States shall ensure that shareholders have the right to vote on the remuneration policy. Member States shall ensure that the vote of shareholders on the remuneration policy is binding. A remuneration policy shall continue to apply until a new one is approved by shareholders. 1

38 However Member States may provide that the vote of the shareholders on the remuneration policy is advisory, provided that where shareholders vote against the remuneration policy, a revised policy is submitted to a vote by the shareholders at the next general meeting. Member States shall ensure that companies submit the remuneration policy to a vote by shareholders at every material change and in any case at least every five years. 2. [deleted] 3. The policy shall explain how it contributes to the business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability of the company. It shall be clear and understandable and describe the different components of fixed and variable remuneration, including all benefits in whatever form, to be awarded to directors. The policy shall indicate the maximum amounts of remuneration that can be awarded. However, in case of recruitment of a director, companies may pay remuneration above that maximum amount where the remuneration package of that director has been subject to a shareholder vote. The policy shall explain how the pay and employment conditions of employees of the company were taken into account when setting the policy or directors' remuneration. Where applicable the policy shall set clear criteria for the award of the variable remuneration. It shall indicate the financial and non-financial performance criteria to be used and explain how they contribute to the business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability of the company, and the methods to be applied to determine to which extent the performance criteria have been fulfilled. Where applicable it shall specify vesting periods for share-based remuneration and retention of shares after vesting, and information on the deferral periods and on the possibility of the company to reclaim variable remuneration. The policy shall indicate the duration of the arrangements with directors and the applicable notice periods, the main characteristics of supplementary pension or early retirement schemes and the terms of the termination and payments linked to termination. The policy shall explain the decision-making process followed for its determination including, where applicable, the role of the committees concerned. Where the policy is revised, it shall describe and explain all significant changes and how it takes into account the views of shareholders on the policy and reports since the last vote on the remuneration policy by the general meeting of shareholders. 4. Member States shall ensure that after the shareholders' vote the policy is published with the date and the results of the shareholders vote is made public without delay and is kept on the company's website at least as long as it is applicable. Article 9b. Information to be provided in the remuneration report and right to vote on the remuneration report 1. Member States shall ensure that the company draws up a clear and understandable remuneration report, providing a comprehensive overview of the remuneration, including all benefits in whatever form, awarded or due over the last financial year to individual directors, including to newly recruited and to former directors. It shall, where applicable, contain all of the following elements: (a) the total remuneration split out by component, the relative proportion of fixed and variable remuneration, an explanation how the total remuneration complies with the adopted remuneration policy and information on how its performance criteria where applied; 2

39 (b) the relative change of the remuneration of directors over at least the last three financial years, its relation to the evolution of the performance of the company and to change in the average remuneration of full time employees of the company other than directors during that period; (c) any remuneration awarded or due to directors of the company from any undertaking belonging to the same group as defined in point (11) of Article 2 of Directive 2013/34/EU; (d) the number of shares and share options granted or offered, and the main conditions for the exercise of the rights including the exercise price and date and any change thereof; (e) information on the use of the possibility to reclaim variable remuneration; (f) information on how the remuneration of individual directors was established, including on, where applicable, the role of the committees concerned. 2. Member States shall ensure that companies: (a) do not use personal data of individual directors in a way that is not compatible with the purposes of facilitation of the exercise of shareholders rights and increase of transparency and accountability with regard to the remuneration of individual directors; (b) do not process special categories of personal data of individual directors which are protected under Article 8 of Directive 95/46/EC, as well as information on remuneration awarded or due to individual directors because of their family situation. 2a. Member States shall ensure that personal data of directors are publicly accessible for no longer than 5 years after the publication of the remuneration report and that companies take appropriate technical measures to limit the public accessibility of personal data of individual directors after this period. Member States shall ensure that at the end of this period, and during an additional period of [8] [10] years, companies only disclose personal data of directors to shareholders upon request. Member State shall ensure that at the end of this additional period of [8] [10] years, personal data of directors are no longer disclosed. 3. Member States shall ensure that shareholders have the right to vote on the remuneration report of the past financial year during the annual general meeting. The company shall explain in the next remuneration report how the vote of the shareholders has been taken into account. However, Member States may provide, as an alternative to the vote, that the remuneration report of the last financial year is submitted to shareholders for discussion in the annual general meeting as a separate item of the agenda. The company shall explain in the next remuneration report how the discussion in the general meeting has been taken into account. 4. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation in relation to this Article, the Commission shall adopt guidelines to specify the standardised presentation of the information laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article. Article 9c. Right to vote on related party transactions 1. Member States shall ensure that companies publicly announce material transactions with related parties at the latest at the time of the conclusion of the transaction. The announcement shall contain at least information on the nature of the related party relationship, the name of the related party, the date and the value of the transaction and any other information necessary to assess the transaction. 1a. Member States may provide that the announcement published according to paragraph 1 is accompanied by a report assessing whether or not the transaction is fair and reasonable from the perspective of the 3

40 shareholders who are not related party, in particular minority shareholders and explaining the assumptions it is based upon together with the methods used. This report is produced by: (-a) an independent third party or; (a) the administrative or the supervisory body or the company or; (b) the audit committee or any committee the majority of which is composed by independent directors; provided that the related parties and the persons related to them are excluded from the preparation of the report. 2. Member States shall ensure that material transactions with related parties are approved by the shareholders or by the administrative or supervisory body of the company according to procedures which prevent a related party from taking advantage of its position and provide adequate protection for the interests of shareholders who are not related party, in particular minority shareholders' interests. Member States may provide that shareholders have the right to vote on material transactions approved by the administrative or supervisory body of the company. Where the related party transaction involves a director or a shareholder, this director or shareholder and the persons related to them shall be excluded from the vote. 2a. Paragraphs 1, 1a and 2 shall not apply to transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business and concluded on normal market terms, provided that the administrative or supervisory body of the company assesses whether these conditions are fulfilled. The related parties and the persons related to them shall be excluded from this assessment. 3. [deleted] 4. Member States may exclude from the requirements in paragraphs 1, 1a and 2: (a) [deleted] (b) transactions entered into between the company and its subsidiaries provided that they are wholly owned or that no other related party of the company has an interest in the subsidiary or that national law provides for adequate protection of interests of shareholders who are not related party, in particular minority shareholders in such transactions. 5. Member States shall ensure that the interests of the minority shareholders of the company who are not related party, in particular minority shareholders are adequately protected in case of transactions concluded between the related party of the company and that company's subsidiaries. 6. For the purposes of this Article material transactions are defined by Member States taking into account: (a) the influence that the information about the transaction may have on the economic decisions of shareholders of the company; (b) the risk that the transaction creates for the company and its minority shareholders. When defining material transactions Member States shall set one or more quantitative ratios based on the impact of the transaction on the revenues, assets, capitalisation or turnover of the company or take into account the nature of transaction and the position of the related party. 4

41 Member States may adopt materiality definitions for the application of paragraphs 1 and 1a different from those for the application of paragraphs 2 and may differentiate the definitions according to the company size. 7. Member States shall ensure that transactions with the same related party that have been concluded in any 12 months period or in the same financial year and have not been subject to the obligations listed in paragraphs 1, 1a or 2 are aggregated for the purposes of those paragraphs. 8. This Article is without prejudice to the rules on public disclosure of inside information defined in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council. IAS 24.9 The following terms are used in this Standard with the meanings specified: A related party is a person or entity that is related to the entity that is preparing its financial statements (in this Standard referred to as the reporting entity ). (a)a person or a close member of that person's family is related to a reporting entity if that person: (i)has control or joint control of the reporting entity; (ii)has significant influence over the reporting entity; or (iii)is a member of the key management personnel of the reporting entity or of a parent of the reporting entity. (b)an entity is related to a reporting entity if any of the following conditions applies: (i)the entity and the reporting entity are members of the same group (which means that each parent, subsidiary and fellow subsidiary is related to the others). (ii)one entity is an associate or joint venture of the other entity (or an associate or joint venture of a member of a group of which the other entity is a member). (iii)both entities are joint ventures of the same third party. (iv)one entity is a joint venture of a third entity and the other entity is an associate of the third entity. (v)the entity is a post-employment benefit plan for the benefit of employees of either the reporting entity or an entity related to the reporting entity. If the reporting entity is itself such a plan, the sponsoring employers are also related to the reporting entity. (vi)the entity is controlled or jointly controlled by a person identified in (a). (vii)a person identified in (a)(i) has significant influence over the entity or is a member of the key management personnel of the entity (or of a parent of the entity). (viii)the entity, or any member of a group of which it is a part, provides key management personnel services to the reporting entity or to the parent of the reporting entity. A related party transaction is a transfer of resources, services or obligations between a reporting entity and a related party, regardless of whether a price is charged. Close members of the family of a person are those family members who may be expected to influence, or be influenced by, that person in their dealings with the entity and include: 5