Infineon Case Study: Successful Combination of Divestitures and Capital Market Measures to Increase Value

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1 Infineon Case Study: Successful Combination of Divestitures and Capital Market Measures to Increase Value Jack Artman Senior Director Head of Mergers and Acquisitions Infineon Technologies AG

2 Infineon is one of the world s largest semiconductor manufacturers Energy Efficiency Mobility Security FY 2010 Rev ~ 4B ~ Employees (2Q2011) Automotive Mio. EUR Chip Card & Security Industrial & Multimarket Mio. EUR 5% 6% 16% 73% 407 Mio. EUR R&D S&M Administration Production SeiteCopyright 2 Infineon T

3 Today, Infineon is a leader in all of its target markets Automotive Power Chip Card #2 #1 #1 14% Renesas Infineon 9% 11% Infineon Toshiba 7% Samsung 7% NXP Freescale 8% Fairchild STM 8% Mitsubishi 6% STM 6% NXP 7% Calendar Year Source: Strategy Analytics, April June 2011 Calendar Year Source: IMS Research, July Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. 27% Infineon Renesas 22% 14% 13% STM 10% Calendar Year Source: Frost & Sullivan, October Seite 3

4 with a strong balance sheet which provides stability and flexibility... Capital structure Safe haven [EUR m] ,585 2, Net cash strong at EUR 2,246bn. We can cope with any industry environment. Q3 FY11 Gross Cash Debt Equity-linked Net Cash Well-positioned to take advantage of any opportunity Infineon is well-positioned to take advantage of opportunities: equipment or fabs for organic growth well targeted acquisitions return of value to shareholders (dividends, share repurchase) 07 June 2011 Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 4

5 but the outlook was much more uncertain in 2009 Lehman Insolvency Financial Crisis Economic Crisis Qimonda Insolvency Qimonda Insolvency Sales Decline in Core Segments Low: 0,35 EUR Short-Term Debt Repayments: 597m due m due Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 5

6 Three transactions proved critical to driving Infineon s turn-around Refinancing Focusing Lehman Insolvenz Kapitalerhöhung 725 Mio. EUR Qimonda Insolvenz Wandelanleihe Wireless Verkauf 1400 Mio. USD Tiefpunkt: 0,35 EUR Wireline Verkauf 243 Mio. EUR Repurchases of debt in the market And restructuring plan Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 6

7 Divestiture as Reinforcement for Capital Increase (Refinancing Phase) Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 7

8 In March 2009, due to uncertainty around its ability to refinance existing debt, Infineon s valuation fell to an alltime low of 293m Mar 2009 Cash and Equivalents 665 Debt Net Cash -375 Book Equity Infineon Aktie [EUR] 7.00 Market Cap [Mio. EUR] Nov. 10 Okt. 10 Sep. 10 Aug. 10 Jul. 10 Jun. 10 Mai. 10 Apr. 10 Mrz. 10 Feb. 10 Jan. 10 Dez. 09 Nov. 09 Okt. 09 Sep. 09 Aug. 09 Jul. 09 Jun. 09 Mai. 09 Apr. 09 Mrz. 09 Feb. 09 Jan. 09 Dez. 08 Nov. 08 Okt. 08 Sep ) Market cap as of closing : 750m shares outstanding * 0,39 = EUR 293m Balance Sheet as of Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 8

9 Infineon addressed the need for cash and increased shareholder confidence with the sale of WLC in July 2009 to Golden Gate Capital for 243m Transaction Facts Signing: 7. Juli 2009 Success Factors Existence of several bidders allowed use of an auction process to get best terms Buyer: Purchase Price: 243m Very quick signing (6 weeks) built market confidence at a time when desparate need for funds existed ~30 Ancillary Agreements (Manufacturing, Logistics, HR, other Services) with terms of up to 18 Months Purchase price low, but partly optimized through extensive ancillary agreements with lucrative margins for Infineon Golden Gate Capital injected additional funds into the purchased business and embarked on a program of acquisitions to strengthen/expand the business provided security to employees Board and WLC management support Effective communication from Infineon solicited positive analyst reaction Transaction completed primarily with involvement of limited key personnel to keep the organization calm and reduce chance of a leak Closing: 6. November Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 9

10 The sale boosted our share price critical, since the German Stock Corporation Act prohibits new share issuance below par ( 2 for Infineon) Jul 2009 Mar 09 Cash and Equivalents Debt Net Cash -375 Book Equity Market Cap Infineon Aktie [EUR] [Mio. EUR] Nov. 10 Okt. 10 Sep. 10 Aug. 10 Jul. 10 Jun. 10 Mai. 10 Apr. 10 Mrz. 10 Feb. 10 Jan. 10 Dez. 09 Nov. 09 Okt. 09 Sep. 09 Aug. 09 Jul. 09 Jun. 09 Mai. 09 Apr. 09 Mrz. 09 Feb. 09 Jan. 09 Dez. 08 Nov. 08 Okt. 08 Sep ) Market cap as of closing on : 750m shares outstanding * 2.58 = 1,935m Balance sheet as of m cash and 131m book equity effect for sale of WLC Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 10

11 Improving outlook helped secure a backstop investor critical, because the investor locked in a share price to guarantee completion of a capital increase Capital Increase Key Facts: Completed in August 2009 Apollo Global Management as Backstop 337m shares at 2.15 ~ 725m cash inflow for Infineon Existing shareholders subscribed 98.7% of the newly issued shares Capital increase without Apollo would not have been possible, because hedge funds would have pushed the share price below 2 by short selling. Apollo also helped kick off a broader rally others are buying, so it must be a good time to buy Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 11

12 Infineon completed its refinancing phase in September 2009 with a healthy net cash position and a ~900% improvement in share price Juli Cash and Equivalents Debt Net Cash -375 Book Equity Infineon Aktie [EUR] Market Cap 7.00 Sept 2009 März [Mio. EUR] Nov. 10 Okt. 10 Sep. 10 Aug. 10 Jul. 10 Jun. 10 Mai. 10 Apr. 10 Mrz. 10 Feb. 10 Jan. 10 Dez. 09 Nov. 09 Okt. 09 Sep. 09 Aug. 09 Jul. 09 Jun. 09 Mai. 09 Apr. 09 Mrz. 09 Feb. 09 Jan. 09 Dez. 08 Nov. 08 Okt. 08 Sep ) Market cap as of closing on : 1.087m shares outstanding * 3.85 = 4,185m Balance sheet as of m cash and 131m book equity effect for sale of WLC Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 12

13 Capital Increase as Reinforcement for Divestiture (Focus Phase) Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 13

14 We leveraged the improvements/lessons to sell the WLS business at optimum terms as a means of streamlining our portfolio and securing strategic options for the future Transaction Facts Signing: 30 August 2010 Success Factors Buyer: Several parallel solutions with various interested parties helped determine fair value and set timeline Purchase Price: $1,400m WLS management support and close involvement in carve-out ~10 Ancillary Agreements (manufacturing, R&D, HR, IT, other Services) with terms up to 12 months Re-use of WLC lessons learned Asset deal Close cooperation of the carve-out team and transaction team Intel injected additional capital and embarked on a program of acquisitions to strengthen/expand the business provided security to employees Closing: Jan Early formation of carve-out team, dedicated carve-out manager, clear role definitions, clear escalation path Detailed diligence on own business; use of findings to a) carve-out only what minimizes risk and stranded cost and b) optimize contract terms Minimal ancillary agreements with minimal durations; dedicated teams to negotiate with link to transaction team and carve-out team Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 14

15 After the sale of WLS, Infineon was more focused, less volatile and well prepared to weather unexpected macro difficulties or take advantage of opportunities Juli 09 Sept 09 Barmittel Schulden Netto Barmittel Eigenkapital Infineon Aktie [EUR] Sept 2010 März 09 Marktkapitalisierung [Mio. EUR] 1) Market cap as of closing on : 1,171m shares outstanding * 6.01 = 7,037m Balance sheet as of m cash and 505m book equity effect for sale of WLS Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 15

16 Summary: Infineon successfully used divestitures and capital market measures to navigate through the crisis and create a more valuable company In the first phase, Infineon used the divestiture of WLC as a refinancing tool The sale itself provided needed immediate cash but more importantly, the sale was a critical move in winning a serious backstop investor and carrying out a successful capital increase In the second phase, Infineon used the divestiture of WLC and the subsequent capital increase as tools to sell the WLS business at optimum terms WLC set up the focus story, which was simply completed with the sale of WLS Capital increase provided Infineon with enough safety buffer to keep numerous options open Infineon was not under any stress to sell Key success factors in both divestitures: Creation of parallel alternatives Tight involvement of Board and top management Early formation and involvement of dedicated carve-out team; integration of the carve-out team and transaction team throught the process (close interaction no silo thinking in subteams) Thorough self due diligence to define what will be sold and what the effects post-sale will be; implementation of learnings in the transaction team for optimum contract terms and the carve-out team to prevent value leakage Knowledge capture and re-use of lessons learned Copyright Infineon Technologies All rights reserved. Seite 16

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18 M&A as Part of ALTANA s Corporate Strategy 9. Deutscher Corporate M&A Kongress Munich, , Dr. Andreas Jerschensky Page 1 Dr. Andreas Jerschensky Corporate Development/M&A 9. Deutscher M&A Kongress

19 ALTANA At a Glance Sales 2010: 1,535 m Employees (a) : 4,937 EBITDA 2010: 314 m EBITDA margin: 20.5% Sales 2010: 541 m Sales 2010: 357m Sales 2010: 377 m Sales 2010: 260m Business Lines Paint Additives Plastics Additives Industrial Applications Measuring & Testing Instruments Business Lines Coatings Graphic Arts Cosmetics & Personal Care Plastics Industry Functional Applications Business Lines Primary Insulation Secondary Insulation Electronic & Engineering Materials Business Lines Converting Specialties Graphic Arts Page 2 Dr. Andreas Jerschensky Corporate Development/M&A 9. Deutscher M&A Kongress (a) 31 Dec 2010

20 ALTANA Three pillars of growth Strategy for Profitable Growth Market Penetration Regional expansion, especially in Asia, India and the U.S. Key account management Innovation New technologies New markets Synergies between divisions Acquisitions Bolt-on acquisitions in every division Portfolio expansion Technology acquisition Growth Objective Average annual growth rate of > 10% p.a Page 3 Dr. Andreas Jerschensky Corporate Development/M&A 9. Deutscher M&A Kongress 6% organic > 4% through acquisitions

21 Page 4 Dr. Andreas Jerschensky Corporate Development/M&A 9. Deutscher M&A Kongress ALTANA Deals in 2011

22 Some Final Statements on Strategy vs. M&A Most of the acquisitions that do fail do not so because of lack of integration skills/management but because of bad strategy M&A as a function/process should not just be understood as a mere action item within a given strategy: Interaction with potential targets and intermediaries could provide new insights into the fundamentals of a strategy and may lead even to a change in strategy Only a thorough understanding of the guiding policy of a strategy enables to design and execute acquisitions which are in line with such policy A workable, preset strategic framework is needed to ensure that opportunities are judged the right way and discipline is needed in applying such framework Page 5 Dr. Andreas Jerschensky Corporate Development/M&A 9. Deutscher M&A Kongress If M&A is a vital measure of a strategy it should be closely linked to the process of strategy development and should be organizationally embedded respectively

23 Thank you for your attention.

24 Deutsche Post DHL Corporate Finance Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs 9.Konzerntag des Bundesverbandes für Mergers & Acquisitions e.v. Dr. Reiner Löffler Munich 18.November 2011

25 Deutsche Post DHL Deutsche Post DHL Group Revenue* (bn ) Mail Communication: 5.6 Parcel Germany 2.7 Dialogue Marketing 2.6 Global Mail Other (Press Services, 1.2 Retail Outlets, etc.) Total 13.8 Global Forwarding, 14.3 Freight Supply Chain: 13.3 Express Total 38.8 EBIT** (bn ) Margin (%) % % % Op. Cashflow (bn ) Employees*** 146, , ,274 * Group Revenues after consolidation of interdivisional transactions ** Underlying EBIT *** Average FTEs FY2010 Source: DPDHL Annual Report 2010 Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 2

26 Dr. Löffler Vice President M&A (Corporate Finance) Since Vice President M&A, Corporate Finance, Bonn, Deutsche Post DHL Head M&A, Ciba Speciality Chemicals, Basel, Switzerland Head Controlling, Strategy, M&A des Segments Immobilien und Internationaler Bergbau & Technik, RAG/heute Evonik, Essen Senior Expert M&A und Beteiligungen, Corporate Finance, BASF AG, Ludwigshafen Married, 3 children Head of Planning & Systems, WANG Deutschland, Frankfurt Hobby: B&W Photography University of Mannheim, Business Management with focus on finance and strategy, Dipl.Kfm. and Dr.rer.pol Born in Ludwigshafen/Rhein Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 3

27 WHY Earnouts in the M&A Process of Large Corporations Challenges Investment types which form challenges Descriptions Small (private) companies & start-ups, High dependency on management, Targets in new markets with new solutions, Distressed or low stability companies Risk averse behavior of corporates Risk averse behavior leads to lower valuation results and therefore a price gap between seller and buyer Potential Risk mitigation measures Contingent Payments, Earn Outs, Put/Calls, Claw backs, etc. Prerequisites for Deferred Payments company at least partially owned by management no immediate full integration desired Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 4

28 The major issue: Price gap Purchase Price Expectations Buyer and Seller: Inverse Expectations on probability structures (due to asymmetric information) 16 Price GAP NO DEAL Meet in the middle 9 no real solution Downside Buyer Base Case Buyer Downside Seller Upside Buyer Seller s Case Upside Probability of cases Expected Price Buyer 15% 60% 15% 7% 3% 6 Seller 3% 7% 15% 60% 15% 12 Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 5

29 Risk Mitigation with contingent payment methods Their usage in the M&A-practice Characteristics of the Targets 1) Private Company With value 40% comprised mostly of 10% intangible assets 23% With high 27% dependency on With a high management growth rate Motives for the use of Earn Outs 1) Retain and motivate manager as former owner 49% Use the delay in payment as a deal financing tool 8% Bridge the valuation gap 43% between buyer and seller "never" "always" (100%) Frequency of use 1) 22% 7% "mainly" (61-99%) 20% 20% "rarely" (0-20%) 31% "often" (21-60%) 1) Master Thesis Project Contingent Payment Structures as Risk Mititgation Tools the Use of Earn Outs and Put/Call Options in the German M&A Market, Nadezhda Lehova, Humboldt University, Berlin, 2011 (Statistics based on 39 DAX companies) 2) CMS European M&A Study 2010 Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 6

30 The Building Blocks of Earn Outs The average structure Earn Out-Size 3) 161% (%=Max Earn Out/Transaction value) 1% Min 33% 16% 47% Average 25th% 75th% Max <1 year: 0% Classic Earn Out vs. Reverse Earn Out 72% 1 to 3 years Duration 1) 24% 3 to 5 years 4% > 5 years KPIs 1) Formula 1) Other non-financial Combinations Stepwise Other financial 6% EBIT 16% 5% 26% 6% Proportional Revenue 17% 16% to performance 23% 68% 17% Proportional EBITDA with Cap Cashflow positions 3) Earn Outs, A Study of Financial Contracting in Acquisition Agreements, Cain, Denis, Denis, Journal of Accounting and Economics, May 2010 Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 7

31 The Difficulties of Earn Outs Risks of Earn Outs and major topics to be agreed and detailed in SPA Risks of Earn Outs 1. Focus on short-term profitability Exodus Exodus total loss of investment after all vendor managers left Transfer of business knowhow to buyer is key! Burn-out of the target no investments in future 2. Moral hazard Using Multiplier effect - payment of cost partially out of private pocket by vendor manager 3. Window dressing/ manipulation of results Requires close contact to business over Earn Out period with audit of each Earn Out calculation 4. Set-up of fearn Out Double Dip fixed price based on base case business plan, but earnout also based on meeting base case goals Significant manipulation 1) "mainly" (>61%) "often" (41-60%) 25% 13% "never" 0% 19% 43% "rarely" (0-20%) "sometimes" (21-40%) Reasons not to use Earn Outs Seller bears the future performance risk (not under his control) High exposure to performance manipulation Integration postponed Complex design and practical application High risk of legal disputes Technical issues can be solved: 1. Consistent measurement of actuals compared with setting of budget targets 2. Handling of Non-operating items/ one-offs 3. Handling of timing differences 4. Allocations and overheads from buyer 5. Changes in accounting principles (GAAP over time or by integration in buyer s group) Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 8

32 Negotiation and Valuation of Earn Outs - Fix & Variable Purchase Price From either or to as well as Value & Purchase Price Key issues in negotiations: 1. Split: fix and variable purchase price (Acid-Test for Seller) 2. In some cases: Allocation of purchase price to Sellers 3. Seller s business plan is the target; upside defines CAP Likely price- 10 range with fixed price Buyer s Valuation Value creation Buyer Total Price Variable Price Downside Buyer Base Case Buyer Downside Seller Upside Buyer Seller s Case Upside CAP Earn Out provides WIN-WIN-situation (as long as Earn Out prices < Values for buyer): Downside Protection for Buyer Upside for Seller if business plan materializes = + Fixed Price Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 9

33 The Risk Mitigation of Earn Outs Major Topics to be agreed and detailed in SPA Key issue: How can seller protect his interests and how much of control is buyer giving up 1. Aligned business plan and targets for EO-period (based on realistic but challenging assumptions in seller s plan) including Operational integration concept (Standalone/partial/ full integration and timing), and resulting governance structure (Decision & Reporting) 2. Realization of synergies included in Earn Out targets or only buyers duty 3. Future development of business and changes of business plan markets, products, countries / required investments 4. Exit of seller-management good and bad leaver clauses and consequences Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 10

34 Excursus: Sample of a Combination of Different Contingencies Put-Option with variable timeline and Earn Out with variable payments TODAY signing i PUT exercising payment of 1 st payment of 2 nd put option tranche tranche Historic valuation Earn Out period year 0 year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 Ø EBIT of last three accounting years Ø EBIT of next three accounting years x EBIT multiple determined by actually achieved EBIT margin 2) x EBIT multiple determined by actually achieved EBIT margin 2) = = Enterprise Value = = Enterprise Value Key Points: - deducting Net Debt as per exercise date - deducting Net Debt as per exercise date = = Equity Value = = Equity Value 50% of Equity Value 50% of Equity Value = 1 st tranche Equity Value = 2 nd tranche Equity Value 1 st tranche purchase price + 2 nd tranche purchase price = Total Purchase Price 1. Split putpayment on historical and future results 2. Multiple not fixed depends on achieved profitability / growth Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 11

35 Earn Outs Seller and Buyer are one Team for the EO-period Questions? Thank you for your attention! Dr. Reiner Löffler Risk Mitigation with Earn Outs Page 12

36 9. Deutscher Corporate M&A Kongress 17. und 18. November in München Genereller Haftungsausschluss für Umstände, die der Käufer aus Due Dilligence kennt? Dr. Thomas Sacher

37 Seite 2 Ausgangsfall Verkäufer bietet Target im limitierten Bieterverfahren zum Verkauf an Fünf Bieter erhalten Zugang zu virtuellem Datenraum: Seiten, gegliedert nach Themenblöcken (Legal, Tax, Financial etc.), Kopieren technisch ausgeschlossen Zugang zum Datenraum zeitlich auf drei Wochen begrenzt, in Q&A-Prozess maximal 100 Fragen zugelassen Bieter lässt Due Diligence Prüfung ( DD ) von internen Fachabteilungen und externen Beratern zu nach oben beschränkten Honoraren durchführen SPA-Entwurf des Verkäufers im Datenraum schließt alle Ansprüche des Bieters für Sachverhalte aus, die Bieter aus Transaktionsprozess und Datenraum kennt

38 Seite 3 Behandlung von Informationen im Informationsprozess (1) Früher kaum Bieterverfahren DD idr nur bei großen oder internationalen Transaktionen Datenräume selten, Datenmaterial idr schlecht aufbereitet und unvollständig selbst bei DD blieb Verkäufer zur dezidierten Aufklärung über Umstände verpflichtet, die seine Garantien einschränken sollten

39 Seite 4 Behandlung von Informationen im Informationsprozess (2) Heute Bieterverfahren immer häufiger DD selbst bei kleineren Transaktionen Standard Datenräume idr virtuell, gut strukturiert, nach wie vor aber häufig (bewusst?) unvollständig Verkäufer kaum mehr zur dezidierten Aufklärung über Umstände bereit, die seine Garantien einschränken sollten Stattdessen soll Kenntnis des Käufers von Informationen aus Transaktionsprozess und vom Inhalt des Datenraums pauschal zugerechnet werden

40 Seite 5 Fragestellungen (1) Sichtweise des Verkäufers Welche Informationen sollen in Datenraum eingestellt werden? Müssen Informationen richtig und vollständig sein? Wie tief muss Geschäftsführung des Verkäufers selbst in Themen einsteigen? Müssen Fachabteilungen im In- und Ausland befragt werden? Wie wird mit Fragen des Käufers im Q&A-Prozess umgegangen? Was passiert, wenn über Nachteile des Targets ungefragt oder gefragt nicht aufgeklärt wird? Haftungsbeschränkung möglich, indem möglichst wenige Personen auf Verkäuferseite eingeschaltet werden?

41 Seite 6 Fragestellungen (2) Sichtweise des Käufers Umgang mit erkennbar unvollständigen Informationen über Target? Rechte, falls Verkäufer ggf. auf Nachfrage unrichtig oder unvollständig informiert? Umgang mit Bestimmung im SPA, die Käufer Informationen aus Transaktionsprozess und Inhalt des Datenraums pauschal zurechnet? Umgang mit Bestimmung im SPA, wonach Käufer erklären muss, dass er keine Kenntnis von Garantieverletzung hat?

42 Seite 7 Aufklärungspflichten des Verkäufers Angaben müssen vollständig und richtig sein Bei Nachfragen wahrheitsgemäße Auskunft nötig Ungefragt Auskunft über Umstände, die Vertragszweck des Käufers vereiteln können, deshalb für Kaufentschluss des Käufers von wesentlicher Bedeutung und Mittteilung nach Verkehrsauffassung zu erwarten

43 Seite 8 Nachforschungspflichten des Käufers Grundsätzlich keine Untersuchungspflicht (anders in USA caveat emptor) Aber: 442 Abs. 1 Satz 1 BGB, keine Haftung des Verkäufers für Mängel bei grob fahrlässiger Unkenntnis des Käufers Übersehen eines Mangels trotz besonderer Sachkunde des Käufers Käufer geht Mangel trotz Warnung des Verkäufers oder eines Dritten nicht nach (indirekter Hinweis nicht ausreichend) Eingehende Untersuchung wäre üblich (Verkehrssitte) und unterbleibt trotzdem Due Diligence als Verkehrssitte?

44 Seite 9 Umgang mit Bieter bekannten Informationen aus DD Bedürfnis nach verbindlicher Festschreibung der Bedeutung der Kenntnis des Käufers für spätere Haftung des Verkäufers Verweis des Verkäufers auf Gesetz ( 442 BGB): keine Haftung (sog. Sandbagging), soweit positive Kenntnis des Käufers ( 442 Abs. 1 Satz 1 BGB) oder großfahrlässige Unkenntnis des Käufers, es sei denn, arglistiges Verschweigen oder Beschaffenheitsgarantie des Verkäufers ( 442 Absatz 1 Satz 2 BGB) Für Käufer idr zu weitgehend (zt unkalkulierbares Risiko), deshalb keine generelle, pauschale Kenntniszurechnung (sog. Sandbagging) anders nur, wenn (i) ausdrücklicher Hinweis im SPA oder (ii) Sachverhalt auf Datenraum CD/ROM oder DVD vermerkt und Fair Disclosure Zurechnung der Kenntnis von Erfüllungsgehilfen und Beratern

45 Seite 10 Sonderfall: Arglist des Verkäufers Für Arglist haftet Verkäufer immer (Haftungsbeschränkungen nicht wirksam) Arglist auch bei Angaben ins Blaue hinein Zurechnung von Kenntnis Dritter ( 278 BGB, 166 BGB) Zurechnung von Kenntnis sog. Wissensvertreter BGH: Zurechnung von Kenntnis von Personen, deren Wissen bei ordnungsgemäßer Organisation aktenkundig festzuhalten, weiterzugeben und vor Vertragsschluss abzufragen gewesen wäre

46 Seite 11 Sonderfragen Garantie des Verkäufers: Informationen im Datenraum richtig und vollständig? Garantie des Käufers: keine Kenntnis von Garantieverletzungen? Aktualisierung von Informationen zwischen Signing und Closing

47 Seite 12 Fazit Generell deutlich professioneller Umgang mit Informationen über Target Informationen über Target als strategisches Mittel des Verkäufers Käufer muss dies wissen und sich entsprechend vorbereiten Gesteigertes Risiko der im Transaktionsprozess beteiligten Berater Erfolg der Transaktion auf Verkäufer- und Käuferseite abhängig von richtigem Umfang mit Informationen über Target

48 Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit.